Case summaries
The petition for an ab initio examination of the asylum application was rejected by the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order (decision being appealed in this case) because the evidence submitted was not deemed to be new and crucial. That ruling in the contested decision was flawed because the General Secretary did not have the authority to decide whether the Applicant had refugee status deeming the evidence submitted (a medical report which linked clinical findings to torture) to not be crucial for granting asylum. Instead, he should have ordered an ab initio examination of the asylum application, making the Administration comply with the relevant procedure. If, during that procedure, it was found that there was a legitimate case, then the Administration should have recognised the Applicant as a refugee.
The fact that Poland agreed to take charge of the asylum procedure of a whole family is, by itself, not a proper basis for an inadmissibility decision. The hierarchy of the criteria for determining the Member State responsible for the procedure on the merits, set out in Art 5(1) Dublin II Regulation, must be respected. In this case the husband and father of the family had already been admitted to the procedure on the merits and, therefore, Art 8 was applicable prior to Art 14.
The case concerns whether or not the accelerated procedure used in the applicant’s claim was consistent with Art 23.4 of the Asylum Procedures Directive which allows for an accelerated procedure. It was found that the accelerated procedure was consistent with the Asylum Procedures Directive because the applicant was found not to be credible.
When a decision on detention is being made it is necessary to consider if the person is a refugee (asylum seeker) and subsequently if expulsion is feasible, and therefore the only permissible purpose of detention.
This case concerned the insufficient sourcing of evidence relied upon by the decision maker in dismissing the applicant’s claim for protection. It was found to be a violation of Art 16.1 of the Asylum Procedures Directive where the decision was insufficiently sourced in the applicant’s file. Further that this violation is not remedied by making specific references to those sources before the court.
This case concerned the submission of evidence for a subsequent asylum application where that evidence could have been submitted in support of the initial application.
It was held that since the applicant could already have produced that evidence in his initial asylum application, the reliance on that evidence could not now be considered as evidence relating to new facts and circumstances that could be relied upon to successfully substantiate a subsequent asylum application. Further, the domestic provision of Art 4:6 of the General Administrative Law Act was not found to be contrary to Art 32 and 34 of the Procedures Directive.
- The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
- In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
- A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
- The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.
The Ministry of Interior is obliged to consider whether the conditions for granting subsidiary protection are fulfilled even when the application for international protection is dismissed as manifestly unfounded when it is clear that the applicant is making an application merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of an earlier or imminent decision which would result in his or her removal, and if the applicant has failed without reasonable cause to make his or her application earlier, having had opportunity to do so.
A permit to stay, granted on humanitarian grounds to a foreigner whose application for asylum has been rejected until such time as it becomes feasible for him to go abroad, is of a temporary nature. It is possible to extend the validity of such a permit if there are exceptional circumstances relating to the prevailing situation in the foreigner's country of origin and/or relating to his personal circumstances. When an application to extend a permit to stay is submitted, the Administration should examine any exceptional grounds that may have been put forward.
Unlike with subsidiary protection, it is necessary for there to be a causal link between persecution and the grounds for persecution when assessing the conditions for granting asylum. The fact that a conflict between LTTE and governmental armed units affected Tamil civilians does not mean nationality qualifies as a ground of persecution.