Case summaries

When a Member State accepts a request by Germany to take charge of an applicant in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (the “Dublin II Regulation”), the applicant may be transferred to that Member State even if he/she limits his/her application to subsidiary protection after the request to take charge has been accepted.

The decision of denying asylum is disproportionate, as the fact that the acts of persecution are indiscriminate and affect a large majority of the population do not exclude the application of the 1951 Convention when the necessary elements of the provision are present. The reports of UNHCR were also noted in the Court’s assessment, particularly regarding the risk groups that the organisation has characterised.

In case of conflict between a domestic and international norm the Court is obliged to adhere to the latter and set aside the former. Given the well-established right to an effective remedy in international and European instruments, an element of which relates to the remedy’s timeliness, the court is obliged to remake the OIN’s subsidiary protection decision and provide the applicant with refugee status. This conclusion applies notwithstanding that domestic legislation prohibits the Court from reforming an OIN decision. To abide by this legislation would result in a never-ending appeal procedure thereby rendering the remedy ineffective.

The Council of State requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the compatibility of Belgian Law with Article 5 of Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Directive”). The Directive requires Member States to respect the principle of non-refoulement, as well as ensure that there is a right to an effective remedy.

Under Belgian Law, the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (the “Commissioner”) can dismiss an asylum application and issue an order to leave the territory (“Return Order”), before any judicial appeals or other asylum procedures have been exhausted.

The question in the current case was whether the relevant Belgian legislative provisions were contrary to the Directive. The proceedings were suspended pending a preliminary ruling by the CJEU (C-77/17 and C-78/17). 

This case is concerned with whether an appeal against the lawfulness of an asylum applicant’s detention was allowed. Thus the prejudicial question was formulated questioning whether the measure under article 8(3)(a-b) recast Reception Conditions Directive is valid with regards to the provisions in Article 6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU) subject to Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

A subsequent application is not admissible unless the interested party presents new facts or elements relating to his personnel situation or to the situation in his country of origin, out of which he could not have had knowledge of previously, and likely, if they have probative value, to modify the appreciation of the legitimacy or the credibility of the application of the interested party.

The director general of OFPRA was right to find that the elements that the applicants presented before him did not significantly increase the probability that they would meet the qualifying conditions to claim protection and that their subsequent applications were inadmissible, without having undertaken a hearing before making the decision on inadmissibility.

When addressing asylum claims, refugee status must be recognised when there is a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons foreseen in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Assessment of an asylum request fundamentally needs careful consideration of the facts and personal circumstances of the asylum seeker, as well as an analysis of the nature of the risk. The criteria of this test does not have to be restrictive, it is sufficient that the competent authority has a rational belief that the requirements are met for the purpose of receiving refugee status.

The question remains open and needs to be clarified in legal proceedings, whether there are systemic flaws in the Bulgarian asylum procedure and conditions of admission, such as pose a risk of infringement of Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) (cf. Article 3(2) Regulation No. 604/2013(Dublin III)) – in particular in the case of a return under the Dublin system.

Tigere (T) appealed against a decision that the legislation which prevented her from obtaining a student loan was compatible with her human right to education under Article 2 Protocol 1 and Article 14 ECHR. To qualify for a loan, the legislation specified that a student had to (a) be settled (i.e. not subject to immigration laws/restrictions) in the UK when the academic year began; (b) be ordinarily resident in England; (c) been ordinarily resident (i.e. “lawfully”) in the UK for the three years before the start of the course; and (d) their residence in the UK under ‘(c)’ was not at any point for full-time education. T was judged not to have met criteria (a) and (c).

This case related to two third country nationals who were ordered to leave the Netherlands, without being granted a period for voluntary departure, on the basis that they constituted a risk to public policy.

The CJEU gave guidance on the meaning of Article 7(4) of the Returns Directive, stating that the concept of a ‘risk to public policy’ should be interpreted strictly with an individualised assessment of the personal conduct of the person. Suspicion or conviction for a criminal offence was a relevant consideration. However, it was unnecessary to conduct a new assessment solely relating to the period for voluntary departure where the person had already been found to constitute a risk to public policy.