Case summaries

A subsequent application is not admissible unless the interested party presents new facts or elements relating to his personnel situation or to the situation in his country of origin, out of which he could not have had knowledge of previously, and likely, if they have probative value, to modify the appreciation of the legitimacy or the credibility of the application of the interested party.

The director general of OFPRA was right to find that the elements that the applicants presented before him did not significantly increase the probability that they would meet the qualifying conditions to claim protection and that their subsequent applications were inadmissible, without having undertaken a hearing before making the decision on inadmissibility.

When addressing asylum claims, refugee status must be recognised when there is a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons foreseen in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Assessment of an asylum request fundamentally needs careful consideration of the facts and personal circumstances of the asylum seeker, as well as an analysis of the nature of the risk. The criteria of this test does not have to be restrictive, it is sufficient that the competent authority has a rational belief that the requirements are met for the purpose of receiving refugee status.

The question remains open and needs to be clarified in legal proceedings, whether there are systemic flaws in the Bulgarian asylum procedure and conditions of admission, such as pose a risk of infringement of Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) (cf. Article 3(2) Regulation No. 604/2013(Dublin III)) – in particular in the case of a return under the Dublin system.

Tigere (T) appealed against a decision that the legislation which prevented her from obtaining a student loan was compatible with her human right to education under Article 2 Protocol 1 and Article 14 ECHR. To qualify for a loan, the legislation specified that a student had to (a) be settled (i.e. not subject to immigration laws/restrictions) in the UK when the academic year began; (b) be ordinarily resident in England; (c) been ordinarily resident (i.e. “lawfully”) in the UK for the three years before the start of the course; and (d) their residence in the UK under ‘(c)’ was not at any point for full-time education. T was judged not to have met criteria (a) and (c).

This case related to two third country nationals who were ordered to leave the Netherlands, without being granted a period for voluntary departure, on the basis that they constituted a risk to public policy.

The CJEU gave guidance on the meaning of Article 7(4) of the Returns Directive, stating that the concept of a ‘risk to public policy’ should be interpreted strictly with an individualised assessment of the personal conduct of the person. Suspicion or conviction for a criminal offence was a relevant consideration. However, it was unnecessary to conduct a new assessment solely relating to the period for voluntary departure where the person had already been found to constitute a risk to public policy. 

The physical border around the enclave of Melilla is conformed by two fences and the intermediate zone created between them. The Spanish military police (Guardia Civil) considers that until a migrant has not overcome the second fence he or she has not entered into Spanish territory and therefore, Spanish law, including the Organic Act 4/2000 on the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration (“Aliens Act”), does not apply to a migrant apprehended in the intermediate zone.

The Court ruled that, although this interpretation may violate international law, since there is no clear definition under Spanish law of where the border is located, the direct refusal of migrants who have reached the intermediate zone, does not constitute an administrative prevarication offence. 

When verifying an asylum seeker’s claimed sexual orientation, Member States’ freedom of action is constrained by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The evaluation of an asylum application should not be based on stereotyped notions and should include an individualised assessment taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances, vulnerability in particular.

Not declaring homosexuality at the outset to the relevant authorities can not result in a conclusion that the individual’s declaration lacks credibility.

This CJEU ruling concerned the interpretation of Article 6 of Directive 2008/115/EC (‘the Return Directive’) in relation to the right to be heard prior to a return decision being made, to return illegally staying third-country nationals.

It was found that where the national authority had explicitly provided for the obligation to leave national territory in cases of illegal stay in its national legislation and the third-country national had properly been heard in the context of the procedure for examining his/her right to stay; the right to be heard did not require the applicant to be given an additional opportunity to present observations prior to the issue of a return decision. 

This case examined the compatibility of the Dublin II Regulation with the European Convention on Human Rights regarding transfers to Italy under the Dublin II Regulation.

The Court found a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights if the Swiss authorities were to send an Afghan couple and their six children back to Italy under the Dublin Regulation without having first obtained individual guarantees from the Italian authorities that the applicants would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the family would be kept together.

The CJEU ruled that it had no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred as they concerned the direct interpretation of the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention.