Case summaries
When analysing if protection from UNRWA has ceased (Article 12(1)(a) Directive 2011/95), account must be taken of the possibility for the individual to concretely access effective protection in any of the other fields within UNRWA area of operations.
Assistance from the Agency must be considered as maintained when an individual has left UNRWA area of operations from a field where he couldn’t obtain effective protection, if the person had previously voluntarily left a field where he could access UNRWA’s assistance, even though he could reasonably foresee, according to the information available for him at the moment of departure, that he wouldn’t be able to receive effective protection from the Agency in the field he was travelling to, or return to the field of origin in the short term.
The Court found no violation of the Convention given that the applicants would have had access to a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion had they entered lawfully into Spain – they did not have any “cogent reasons” for not using the border procedures available at designated entry points. As such, the lack of an individualised procedure for their removal was the consequence of their own conduct.
The Court recognised self-defence in a case where migrants were charged with assault against a police officer following their rescue at sea and their impending return to Libya. Their well-founded fear of return to Libya provided the basis for their defence of duress.
Article 21(2) of the directive precludes Member States from issuing a measure of refoulement or expulsion against the persons covered by one of the scenarios described in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 if this would expose the concerned persons to the risk of their fundamental rights as enshrined in Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU.
The notification about the intention of withdrawal from the EU by the Member-State responsible for the examination of the application for international protection does not trigger the determining Member-State’s obligation to make use of the discretionary clause of Article 17(1) 604/2013 EU. Similarly, Article 6 (1) cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the Member State that is not responsible to take into account the best interests of the child and to examine the application itself under 17 (1)
As a result of a transfer order to Italian authorities joined with house arrest, the applicant lodged an appeal. She argued she would be at risk of being exposed to inhuman and degrading treatments, as well as to systemic lapses of the Italian asylum system. In this case, the administrative tribunal granted annulment of those orders issued by the prefect of la Haute-Garonne in the light of the current Italian asylum conditions and the reasons motivating the applicant to reach France after having stayed in Italy.
The case concerned the conformity of integration requirements for residence permit applicants in Dutch law with Article 15 of Directive 2003/86, regarding autonomous residence permits. The CJEU held that it cannot be excluded that such a residence permit may be dependent on the successful completion of a civic integration examination on the language and society of that Member State. However, the connection of residence permits with integration frameworks cannot go beyond what is necessary for the objective of facilitating integration of third-country nationals.
The Council of State decided on the date from which the 6-month time limit provided by Article 29§1 of the Dublin regulation 604/2013 begins running or when it starts running again in case of an interruption. At the expiry of this deadline, the responsibility of the examination of an asylum claim falls back to the Member State which requested another Member State that charge be taken or to take back, as it did not proceed to the applicant’s transfer. The Council specified that this deadline starts running once the other Member State has accepted the request that charge be taken or to take back. In case of an appeal, the delay is interrupted and begins running again at the date of the final judgment deciding on this appeal. Following appeals do not interrupt this newly-established delay.
CJEU rules that Hungarian national law which defines ‘serious crime’ (in the context of exclusion from subsidiary protection) as a crime with a possible custodial of 5 years sentence as incompatible with the Qualification Directive. Instead, each crime must be looked at on an individual basis to ascertain its “seriousness”.
CJEU (First Chamber) finds appeal against decision of the General Court dismissing the actions for annulment of the ‘EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016’ manifestly inadmissible.