Italy - Tribunal of Trapani - Office of the Judge for Preliminary Investigations (Piero Grillo)
Keywords:
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Detention
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Description
"Restriction on freedom of movement through confinement that is ordered by an administrative or judicial authority(ies) in order that another procedure may be implemented. In an EU asylum context, this means confinement of an asylum seeker by a Member State within a particular place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of movement. This may occur during any stage of or throughout the asylum process, from the time an initial application is made up to the point of removal of an unsuccessful asylum seeker. In an EU Return context, Member States may only detain or keep in a detention facility a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular when: (a) there is a risk of absconding; or (b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process. Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence." |
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Inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
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Description
A form of serious harm for the purposes of the granting of subsidiary protection. The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Celibici defined cruel or inhuman treatment as ‘an intentional act or omission, that is an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, that causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.’ “Ill-treatment means all forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including corporal punishment, which deprives the individual of its physical and mental integrity." |
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Non-refoulement
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Description
A core principle of international Refugee Law that prohibits States from returning refugees in any manner whatsoever to countries or territories in which their lives or freedom may be threatened. Note: The principle of non-refoulement is a part of customary international law and is therefore binding on all States, whether or not they are parties to the Geneva Convention. |
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Safe third country
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Description
Any other country, not being the country of origin, in which an asylum seeker has found or might have found protection. Note: The notion of safe third country (protection elsewhere/first asylum principle) is often used as a criterion of admissibility to the refugee determination procedure. |
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Torture
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Description
“Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him/her for an act s/he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” |
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Real risk
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Description
In order to be eligible for subsidiary protection, a third country national or stateless person must demonstrate that if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, s/he would face a real risk of serious harm as defined in QD Art. 15 and that s/he is unable, or owing to such risk, unwilling to avail her/himself of the protection of that country. The fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious indication of the applicant's well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. |
Headnote:
The Court recognised self-defence in a case where migrants were charged with assault against a police officer following their rescue at sea and their impending return to Libya. Their well-founded fear of return to Libya provided the basis for their defence of duress.
Facts:
On the 8th of July 2018, the Italian tugboat Vos Thalassa rescued and brought on board, approximately 65 migrants sighted in the Libyan Search and Rescue (SAR) area while it was engaged in support activities to the Libyan oil rig Al Jurf – Oilfield. Following the absence of a response by the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) and commands made by the Libyan coast guard, the Vos Thalassa reversed course to the south.
The Captain’s decision to reverse the vessel’s course to Libya caused a state of disquiet among the passengers on board. After realising that there was a real possibility of return to Libya thanks to the GPS of a mobile phone in possession of a migrant on board, they revolted against the crew. According to the evidence gathered, there were mostly two migrants within the group (the defendants of the present case), one from Sudan and the other from Ghana, who managed to take control of the ongoing situation spurring the others into action and adopting violent gestures against the cabin staff. Following this, the Captain reversed the course of the vessel back to Italy, in order to avoid any deterioration of the dangerous situation– given that the crew was outnumbered by the 65 rescued persons. After the change of course the Vos Thalassa waited for the arrival of the Italian Military Navy Ship Diciotti in order to transfer the migrants.
The two defendants were accused of violent and intimidating actions against the crew of the Vos Thalassa.
Decision & reasoning:
The Tribunal of Trapani had to determine whether the actions adopted by the Sudanese and the Ghanaian defendants against the crew were in violation of the provisions of the penal code or whether there was a situation of duress that would justify self-defence, since the decision to change course to the Libyan Coast would result in a violation of the rights of the migrants on board the vessel.
In determining whether a legitimate defence could be invoked in the present case, the judge for the preliminary rulings found it necessary to investigate its defining elements such as the need of the existence of a self or somebody else’s right to defend; the injustice of the received offence and the proportionality of the defence against the aggressor.
With regard to rescue at sea, Italy is legally bound by the 1979 Hamburg Convention, which provides that the State that conducts a rescue operation – even if not in the SAR zone of its competence – is responsible for the landfall and the disembarkation of the individuals in a safe harbour (the so called place of safety, POS). According to the ECtHR settled case law, the security of the latter refers principally to the physical security of the individuals involved but also, to the effective possibility to request asylum.That being the case, the central question of the case is to determine if at the time of the facts Libya could be considered a POS. Relying on the information from UNHCR collected during the investigation, the Court noted that Libya – at that time – was not a safe country given the volatile political and social situation which destabilized and endangered the daily life of Libyan citizens but especially for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants.
It was pointed out how the continuous guerrilla wars between rival factions and the inability to respect the international agreement with the UNin the area, led to Libya becoming a departure place for many migrants wishing to travel to Europe. If for Libyan citizens the situation is of evident danger and uncertainty, it is even more so for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants who transit through the Country, especially since Libya is not a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention and it does not have domestic asylum legislation. Domestic immigration law heavily punishes irregular entry, residence and exit from the State with undefined prison sentences and a fine of 700$. Spread all around the country, detention centres have become theatre to continuous and systematic human rights violations of the detainees; detention in fact appears to be entirely arbitrary both in its substance and with regards to its procedural aspect. It seems clear that Libya could not be considered as a place of disembarkation for migrants. According to the decision of the Tribunal, an eventual push back to the Libyan territory, an unsafe harbour, would result in a violation of the non-refoulement customary law.
In the context of the defendants’ self-defence, the Tribunal of Trapani recognized the existence of the right to be conducted in a POS where they will not be subject to treatment against art. 2 and art. 3 ECHR which the passengers of the Vos Thalassa tried to defend with their actions against the crew. Pursuant to art. 52 of the penal code, self-defence can only be invoked if the danger has not been created voluntarily by the actor. In this regard the judge confirmed how, both for the Sudanese defendant and the Ghanaian one, the danger was not created on purpose. Even in the case of the latter, whose Country of origin is safe, the act of self-defence is to be considered in the context of defence on behalf of other migrants on board, who were coming from unsafe third Countries such as Sudan.
Lastly, the Tribunal acknowledged the proportionality of the defendants’ acts, since the right to life and not to be subject to inhuman or degrading treatments shall not be limited by the right of the crew. In the eyes of the judge, if such defensive actions had not been taken, the migrants would have been surely brought back to Libya; the naturally necessity of those actions has to be acknowledged since the defendants did not have the possibility to escape the vessel and its destination.
In conclusion the Tribunal found the existence of the conditions under art. 52 criminal code and both defendants were acquitted on the grounds of self-defence. The charge of smuggling was also dropped since there was no evidence that the two defendants were smugglers or traffickers but passengers as anyone else on the Vos Thalassa. For this reason it is clear how the entrance in the Italian territory of the foreigners on board derived solely from an attempt to avoid a push back to Libya.
Outcome:
Acquittal of both defendants.
Observations/comments:
This summary was written by Maria Giulia Marinari, student at the University of Turin.
Relevant International and European Legislation:
Cited National Legislation:
| Cited National Legislation |
| Italian Criminal Code – art. 52 |
| Italian Constitution – art. 2; art. 10 co. 2and co. 3; art. 80; art. 117 co.1 |
Cited Cases:
| Cited Cases |
| ECtHR - Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [GC], Application No. 27765/09 |
| ECtHR - Al-Adsani v United Kingdom [GC], Application No. 35763/97 |
| ECtHR - Soering v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, 7 July 1989 |
| ECtHR - Chahal v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, 15 November 1996 |
| ECtHR – Saadi v. Italy, Application No. 37201/06, 28 February 2008 |
Other sources:
Domestic Case Law Cited
Cass. Sec. 1, Sentence n. 56330 13/09/2017
Cass. Sec. 6 Sent. n. 31288 28/03/2018
Const. Sent. n. 295 1984
Cass. Sec. 1 sent. n. 48291 21/06/2018
Other Member States' Case Law
A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 8th December 2015, House of Lords
International Tribunals
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, 10th December 1998, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Prison Case Miguel Castro v. Perù, 25th November 2006, Interamerican Court of Human Rights
Public Committee against torture in Israel and others v. State of Israel, Supreme Court of Israel, 6th September 1999