Case summaries
The Court of Justice held that defending personal interests against illegally acting non-state actors due to state corruption can be regarded as ‘political opinion’ under Directive 2011/95 if perceived as opposition by the persecuting actors.
The Court ruled that Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip can no longer count on the UNRWA’s protection or assistance. Therefore, the applicant does not fall within the scope of Article 1D of the Geneva Convention and must be recognized as a refugee.
Except for very limited exceptions, the statutory three-year waiting period for family reunification of persons granted ‘temporary protection’ does not allow for an individualised assessment of the interest of family unity in light of the concrete situation of the persons concerned. Eventually the Court finds a violation of Article 8 of the Convention since the measure (whose goal is not otherwise challenged) had a disproportionate impact in the case at hand.
This case is concerned with whether the decision to deny the asylum application and the subsequently imposed entry ban were justified based on articles 1F(a)-(c). Under these provisions the Secretary of State can raise national security as a ‘serious ground’ for his decision if an element of ‘personal participation’ can be proven.
The case appeals a decision of the Ministry of Interior to deny asylum and subsidiary protection considering the alleged crimes against humanity committed by the appellant, national of Iran. He was a member of a declared criminal organization. The Court analyses his adherence to the organisation following a proportionality approach. It addresses the need to examine the existence of substantial proof of the commission of crimes against humanity when applying the exclusion clauses to deny international protection.
The issue in this case was “complicity” – the Court analysed the facts of the applicant’s involvement in a violent paramilitary force in Iran to determine whether he was complicit in crimes against humanity, so as to be excluded from international protection.
Passive complicity in genocide includes a material element and an intentional element, as active complicity does.
The case concerned an appeal lodged before the High National Court against the decision of the Ministry of Interior to refuse to grant refugee status based on the application of two exclusion clauses, Art 1F(a) and 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The applicant challenged the application of the exclusion clauses arguing an individual assessment was required, as well as evidence of participation in the crimes mentioned. The appeal was rejected.
Serious reasons have to be established in order to apply the exclusion clause in Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, i.e. the material and intentional elements specific to the complicity.
Membership of an organisation that was responsible for committing war crimes is not sufficient on its own to justify exclusion under Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention or Article 12(2)(a) of the Qualification Directive. Membership of the LTTE or its ‘Intelligence Division” was not enough, on its own, to justify the applicant’s exclusion.
Responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity should be considered with regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and other international legal materials that have come into existence following the adoption of the Refugee Convention.
The decision maker should concentrate on the actual role played by the particular persons, taking all material aspects of that role into account so as to decide whether the required degree of participation is established. The Court identified a non-exhaustive list of some of the relevant factors that should be considered.