Case summaries

The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the ground that he qualified for subsidiary protection under Article 2(e) and (f) of the Qualification Directive and was therefore entitled to a residence permit under Article 24(2) of the Qualification Directive.

In dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal found that: (a) Article 24 of the Qualification Directive does not confer a substantive right of residence in the member state concerned but rather its function is to determine the modalities whereby a right of residence otherwise existing is to be documented, and (b) the Procedures Directive is a truly adjectival instrument of EU legislation which does not create any substantive rights in the realm of asylum or subsidiary protection.

The CJEU ruling concerned the scope of protection available under EU law to third country nationals suffering from serious illness whose removal would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The CJEU surmisedthat the removal of a person suffering a serious illness to a country where appropriate treatment was not available could in exceptional circumstances be contrary to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in such circumstances their removal had to be suspended pursuant to Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. The Directive 2008/115/EC required the provision of emergency health care and essential treatment of illness to be made available to such persons during the period in which the Member State is required to postpone their removal.

A member state cannot rely on the fact that there are no specialized detention facilities in a part of its territory to justify keeping non-citizens in prison pending their removal.

The case concerns a family of asylum seekers who needed accommodation in Belgium while their asylum application was being considered. The CJEU declares that if a Member State chooses to provide material reception to asylum seekers in the form of a financial allowance rather than direct public services, the allowance must be enough to ensure a dignified standard of living. In addition, the allowance must be provided from the time at which the asylum application is made and should ensure that it is sufficient to enable minor children to be housed with their parents in order to maintain the family unity of the asylum seekers.

LGBTI asylum seekers (1) may be members of particular social group, (2) cannot be expected to conceal or restrain their expression of sexual orientation to reduce risk of persecution. (3) All criminalisation does not per se amount to persecution, but imprisonment actually applied does.

Refugee status was recognised for a transgender woman from Pakistan because discrimination for reasons relevant to asylum as well as involuntary prostitution to earn a living are sufficiently serious to represent persecution within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

The right to pocket money for an asylum seeker whose placement in a private address is permitted by the Migration Office because of justified reasons is part of the right to dignity. Legislation depriving a person of this right is not in line with the Constitution. 

Rules on rights of applicants for international protection (Governmental Decree, Official Gazette no.64/14) determining that financial aid for asylum seekers placed in a private address is to be decreased by 50% might endanger the applicant’s right to human dignity. 

This case concerned the legality of a circular in French law which was challenged by two organisations on the basis that it was contrary to EU Law under the Reception Conditions Directive in so far as it excludes asylum seekers from entitlement to allowances if they are in the Dublin procedure in France. The CJEU held that the Reception Conditions Directive applies in such a scenario and therefore asylum seekers in the Dublin procedure should have access to the minimum reception conditions laid down in that Directive. This obligation ceases when the person is actually transferred to another Member State.

The applicant sought to rely on her Islamic proxy marriage to her husband, a recognised refugee in Ireland, to resist removal to the UK under the Dublin Regulations. Her application for judicial review failed as she was held to have forfeited her right under Article 7 of the Dublin II Regulation due to delay on her part in asserting that right.

This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application.