Case summaries

The case concerns a family of asylum seekers who needed accommodation in Belgium while their asylum application was being considered. The CJEU declares that if a Member State chooses to provide material reception to asylum seekers in the form of a financial allowance rather than direct public services, the allowance must be enough to ensure a dignified standard of living. In addition, the allowance must be provided from the time at which the asylum application is made and should ensure that it is sufficient to enable minor children to be housed with their parents in order to maintain the family unity of the asylum seekers.

The Supreme Court held that a person who is resisting a Dublin  transfer to the Member State responsible for processing the applicant's asylum claim need not show that there is a “systemic deficiency” in that Member State’s asylum system, rather that the conditions in that Member State would expose the person to inhumane and degrading treatment as prohibited by Article 3 ECHR. 

An action for annulment before the Council for Alien Law Litigation was not an effective remedy. The Law of 15 March 2012 limiting the remedy against a decision rejecting an asylum application to an action for annulment when the Applicant came from a safe country of origin, whereas other applicants were able to seek a ‘full-remedy action’, breached the principle of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution. The said Law was therefore repealed by the Constitutional Court.

It is the Applicant's age on the date of the asylum application rather than the date of the transfer decision that forms the basis for the assessment of whether or not the Dublin Regulation applies.

Processing an appeal without a hearing, on application of Article 91(2) of the Foreigners Act (2000), is not in breach of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The contested judgment is unconstitutional as it does not provide a clear way of assessing the jurisdiction of the third country when dealing with the application. It also reveals that the situation of the Applicant for international protection is unclear in the event that the application is rejected by the third country and the Applicant is not allowed to enter its territory, and shows that it is unclear as to what the Applicant can contest in this procedure.

An efficient legal system that would stop the extradition to a country in which the Applicant could be exposed to inhuman treatment has to have suspensive effect.

The interest of an applicant to obtain a temporary stay from deportation to Italy for the time being predominates, if the applicant, in case of his return back to Italy, would be threatened with serious damage to his health due to inadequate accommodation opportunities there and because medical care would not be guaranteed due to a permanent overstretch of resources.

This ruling concerned the scope of judicial review when reviewing compliance with the criterion of Article 10(1) for determining responsibility for examining an asylum application under Regulation 343/2003. The Court held that Art. 19(2) of the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances where a Member State has agreed to take charge of an applicant for asylum on the basis of the Art. 10(1) criterion the only way in which the applicant for asylum can call into question the choice of that criterion is by pleading systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum in that Member State, which provide substantial grounds for believing that the applicant for asylum would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the Charter.

A transfer in accordance with the Dublin Regulation does not require the Swedish Migration Board to investigate ex officio whether there are deficiencies in the asylum system in Italy. The transfer does, however, breach the right to a family life, in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

This ruling concerned the determination of the Member State responsible when the Member State primarily designated as responsible according to the criteria in the Dublin II Regulation has systemic deficiencies leading to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker facing transfer there would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter. It does not in itself mean that the determining Member State is required to examine the asylum application under Article 3(2) but must further examine the criteria under Chapter III of the Regulation.