Case summaries
The Court recognised the Applicant as a refugee because he would be at risk of persecution due to his political opinions upon returning to his home country.
The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.
The court found that a prohibition of deportation under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act (corresponding to Art. 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive) was established due to the existence of a general risk of persecution in case of return to Syria. The Administrative Court, in their assessment of risk, went far beyond the prevailing case law, particularly that of the High Administrative Courts.
A particular mode of persecution cannot be detected in Syria due to the arbitrariness and the juxtaposition of different intelligence services, whose impact cannot be predicted.
A further deterioration of the situation has occurred in light of recent developments and the bloody suppression of the protest movements.
Currently even persons who have not been politically active in exile are, with considerable probability, at risk of being arrested on return, not only for a short period - they are also at risk of torture and other inhuman treatment.
This case concerned reliance upon demeanour in refusing a refugee application. Then Court found that an asylum decision maker must be careful not to misplace reliance upon demeanour and risk construing as deliberate lack of candour from a demeanour which may be the result of nervousness, of the stress of the occasion and even of the embarrassment of being an asylum seeker.
The case involves analysis of Art 5 of the Qualification directive. The applicant converted to Christianity in Ireland.
The Court stated that when analysing the behaviour of an applicant in the country of asylum, in this case conversion to Christianity, the issue is how such behaviour would be considered in the country of origin. Also, that while the state is entitled to view some claims based on sur place activities with a heightened degree of scepticism, the question involves whether, objectively, the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution.
The Court granted leave to the applicant for judicial review of the decision of the Minister for Justice to issue a deportation order.
This case concerned fear of persecution for reasons of race and membership of a particular social group. The provisions of Article 1(4) of Presidential Decree 61/1999, which should be interpreted with reference to Articles 3 and 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, recognize the special circumstances of asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors, for whom special procedural guarantees have been established. When examining asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors one must consider the Applicants' maturity and level of mental development; take into account the fact that they may have a limited knowledge of the prevailing situation in their country; and also bear in mind that their ways of expressing their fears may differ from those of adults. Particular emphasis is given to the existence of objective factors, based on which one can assess the existence of a well-founded fear that unaccompanied minors may be persecuted in their own country. The contested decision is annulled for insufficient reasoning because there is no evidence in the file that the Administration took care to ensure that a special temporary representative was appointed for the unaccompanied minor, and there is no reference in the report to there having been an oral assessment to determine the level of his mental maturity.
The situation in Iraq is not characterised by an armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. In any case, there is no sufficient individual risk for returnees.
A Lebanese woman was recognised as a refugee after a death threat by her brother because of her way of life. The court found:
- State protection doesn’t exist against ‘honour killings’ in Lebanon.
- Women who do not accept discrimination and denial of rights, which are based on tradition and social circumstances in their home country, constitute a particular social group in terms of Art. 10 (2) (d) of the Qualification Directive.
- Even a single person can be a non-state actor under Section 60 (1) sentence (4) (c) of the Residence Act (identical to Art 6 (c) of the Qualification Directive).