Case summaries

The CJEU ruled on  the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 39 of the Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive.

The Federal Administrative Court has to clarify whether the petition for action directed solely at the obligation to decide on the asylum application is admissible. The question if it is also possible to directly oblige the defendant to grant international protection or to establish prohibitions on deportation by means of an action is not the subject of the decision. As a result, the court comes to the conclusion that there was a delay by the respondent of providing the decision on the asylum application without sufficient reason and that the plaintiff has a need for legal protection for its action for failure to act.

Member States can issue a return decision together with, or right after, a negative decision on an asylum application at first instance, as long as they ensure that all judicial effects of the return decision are suspended during the time allowed to appeal and pending that appeal.

During that period, and despite being subjected to a return decision, an asylum applicant must enjoy all the rights under the Reception Conditions Directive. The applicant can rely upon any changes in circumstances affecting his claim that came up after the return decision, before the appeals authority.

The issue to be decided in this case was whether the applicant was entitled to judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Applications Commissioners, or whether her complaints could be adequately addressed on appeal to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. 

This case examines whether, for a subsequent application, internal review followed by Judicial Review is an effective remedy, as provided by Article 39 of the Council Directive 2005/85/EC (“the Asylum Procedures Directive”).

The detention of an asylum-seeker who claimed he had been tortured because of his sexual orientation was unlawful in part.

The case concerns three unconnected Iranian nationals who unsuccessfully claimed asylum in the Republic of Cyprus then came to the UK where they made asylum claims.  A further right to appeal remained with the Cypriot Supreme Court.  The case is a challenge by the applicants to the SSHD’s refusal to decide their asylum claims substantively; certification of their asylum claims on safe third country grounds; and certification of their human rights claims as clearly unfounded.

The Court concluded that there was no real risk that the applicants, if returned to Iran from Cyprus, would be refouled there and the inclusion of Cyprus on the list of safe third countries involves no incompatibility with the ECHR.  The Court was wholly unpersuaded that there was any flagrant breach of Article 5 in Cyprus for Dublin returnees who have had a final decision on their claim.

The non-suspensive effect of a decision not to further examine a subsequent application under Article 32 of the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive is not in violation of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter since the decision’s enforcement will not lead to the applicant being removed and is therefore unlikely to expose the applicant to a risk of inhumane treatment.

In appealing against the Migration Agency’s and the Migration Court’s rejections of the Applicant’s application for leave to remain in Sweden, the Applicant claimed grounds for protection which he/she had not previously raised before the Migration Agency. Claiming grounds for protection meant that special requirements for asylum applications applied and the Applicant was entitled to a personal interview before the Migration Agency. The Migration Court of Appeal referred the Applicant’s case back to the Migration Agency as the Migration Court could not be the body to try the asylum application in the first instance.

This case examined the denial of a minor’s application for asylum which was decided primarily on the failure of his mother’s application. The Refugee Appeals Tribunal did not consider Country of Origin Information (COI) from the child’s perspective. Furthermore, clear reasons were not given for the refusal decision. The High Court granted leave and quashed the Refugee Appeals Tribunals decision to deny refugee status to the child. The Court also held that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration of the Tribunal both with regard to the procedure and substantive consideration of appeal.