Case summaries

A stateless Kurd from Syria was not recognised as a refugee. The court held:

1. The denial of re-entry of stateless Kurds is not to be considered political persecution because a general institutional practice cannot be detected which is aimed against ethnic Kurds in a manner that is relevant to asylum grounds (Art 10 of the Qualification Directive).
2. Whether the legal practice of Syrian legislation on citizenship and the denial of re-entry are part of a restrictive policy towards Kurds, and support the aims of the State of Syria in respect of its settlement policy, is not important when determining political persecution under Section 60 (1) sentence (5) of the Residence Act in connection with Art. 9 and 10 Qualification Directive.

The Iranian applicants’ asylum claim was rejected by the authorities as they were not found credible. As a result of this finding, the authorities did not consider their account in light of the country of origin information on Iran. The court quashed the decision and granted refugee status to the family reasoning that the authorities are obliged to carry out a thorough and complete fact assessment.

It was found that the contradictions in the applicants' account were not relevant from the point of view of international protection. The court also ruled that the authority is obliged to clarify misunderstandings at hearings, at the same time applicants have to be given the opportunity to justify contradictions and incoherencies in their statements.

1. In principle, a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) has to be considered as political persecution according to Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
2. In Nigeria, FGM is still widespread in all known forms. For the Edo ethnic group, it is usually performed between seven and fourteen days after birth.
3. The number of circumcisions performed (among the Edo ethnic group) during puberty has decreased significantly in recent years and circumcisions in adulthood are no longer performed, or they are only carried out in a small number of cases.

In the present case the court found that it was unlikely that the applicant was at risk of FGM considering her age (five years) and the fact that both her parents opposed the practice. Further, the requirements of ‘Prohibition of deportation’ (Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act) were not established; it was considered unlikely that the applicant would actually return to Nigeria as her mother had residency in Germany.

The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) rejected an application for asylum and did not assess the risk of serious harm because the applicant was deemed not credible. The Metropolitan Court found this decision unlawful and ordered that the risk of serious harm be analysed in a new procedure. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Court found the assessment of non-refoulement unlawful, since all the available country information assessed concerned Serbia, however, the applicant's country of origin was Kosovo.

Before applying the exclusion clause in a case of complicity in an honour killing, the Court should inquire whether, on the one hand family constraint might have lowered the free will of the applicant and, on the other hand whether his young age might justify that he was more vulnerable to this constraint.

A single woman from Nigeria (Urhobo) was eligible for protection from deportation under Section 60 (7) sentence (1) of the Residence Act due to a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage. The economic and social situation in Nigeria is difficult and tense even for the vast majority of the population. The situation is much worse for single women as women in Nigeria are exposed to multiple discrimination. To a large extent they are under legal incapacity, so that in practice they are only in a position to protect their own interests if they are supported by their family.

This case concerned the treatment of evidence from unaccompanied minors. The applicant was an unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan. He claimed asylum on the basis of a fear of persecution both by the Taliban and the Afghan government. The Refugee Appeals Tribunal refused his refugee appeal on the grounds that the applicant was not credible and that his claim was not objectively well-founded. The Court found that the Tribunal Member had engaged in impermissible speculation and conjecture in relation to the applicant’s prospect of State protection in Afghanistan, that the Tribunal Member had imputed expectations to the applicant without any consideration of the applicant’s level of maturity at the time, and that the Tribunal Member had failed to consider whether the applicant’s fears in relation to the Taliban were realistic having regard to his age, maturity and the particular circumstances in Northern Afghanistan.

1. Refugee status was recognised because of a risk of persecution in case of return to Vietnam due to “exposed” political activities in exile.
2. Recognition as a refugee was not excluded by Section 28 (2) of the Asylum Procedure Act. Contrary to the case law of the Federal Administrative Court, political activities in exile do not constitute “circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision”  within the meaning of Art. 5.3 of the Qualification Directive , but fall under Art. 5.2. Therefore, Member States have no competence to regulate the meaning of such "activities" by applying Art 5.3. This is also demonstrated in the differentiation in Art. 4.3 (c) and (d). Art. 5 (2) of the Qualification Directive which essentially corresponds with the new Section 28 (1a) of the Asylum Procedure Act, although the term "activities" has not been adopted in the latter provision.

Subsidiary protection can be granted if on return to their country of origin an applicant would face a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The question at issue was whether the reasons for such ill-treatment related to Refugee Convention persecution grounds or not. All international protection statuses require an individual threat, which cannot be indirect as the risk assessment is a future oriented examination of the possibility of a threat, along with the applicant’s individual circumstances and the probabilities of risk.

1. The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
2. In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
3. A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
4. The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.