Case summaries
Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83 requires the determining authority, under its duty of cooperation, to obtain up-to-date country of origin information and, where relevant, a medico-legal report on the applicant’s mental health; a breach of that duty does not automatically lead to annulment unless it may have affected the outcome.
Under Directive 2005/85, delays in the asylum procedure cannot be justified by legislative changes and, on their own, do not warrant setting aside a decision absent an impact on the outcome.
Article 4(5)(e) of Directive 2004/83 means that a false statement later explained and withdrawn at the first opportunity does not, by itself, undermine the applicant’s general credibility.
The Migration Court committed serious breaches of procedure in an asylum case (in which grounds arising sur place were cited), as the Court failed to respond to all requests, state its assessment of political activity sur place, or communicate important written documents.
The political activities carried out in Belgium by the Syrian Applicant justified granting him refugee status; he should not be confined to the subsidiary protection granted due to the indiscriminate violence generated by the armed conflict in Syria.
The Court recognised the Applicant as a refugee because he would be at risk of persecution due to his political opinions upon returning to his home country.
The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.
The appellant is a Syrian national of Kurdish ethnicity and claims to be affiliated to the Kurdish political party “Azadi Akrad Siria” and to carry out political propaganda activities on their behalf.The Court affirms the denial of asylum and furthermore excludes the appellant from having the status of refugee sur place, even though the situation in Syria has changed since the application for asylum was lodged.However, taking into account the severe deterioration of the socio-political situation in Syria, the Supreme Court recognises the appellant’s right to remain in Spain on humanitarian grounds.
The third action in a row brought by a foreign woman for refugee status ended in the issue of a judgment dismissing the case as it was found that the basis for the application was the same as in the previous cases and the application was therefore inadmissible. The Court overturned the negative decision by the Polish Council for Refugees, as the new application by the foreign woman stated that she had divorced her then husband and had been in a relationship for a year with a Polish citizen, which might cause persecution on religious grounds were she to return to her country of origin.
The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.
The Plaintiff’s previous experience does not lead to the conclusion that the Plaintiff is afraid of persecution (in the event that he was returned) based on race, religion, national identity, membership of a particular social group or a certain political belief, as his fear is based on the possible consequences of retribution merely because he fled. According to the judgment of the Supreme Court the fact that he fled from the Taliban does not make him a “member of a particular social group” on the basis of which his refugee status could be recognised.
Because the Plaintiff did not mention his current political conviction and his current anti-Taliban religious belief when applying for international protection he is not entitled to a refugee sur place status.
This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application.
The applicant, from Iran, had not been politically active in Iran but participated in demonstrations in Sweden and appeared with his photo on dissident websites and TV. The applicant was considered to have been engaged in low-level political activity. Thus, he was deemed not to be of interest to the Iranian authorities and was therefore not considered to be a refugee or in need of subsidiary protection on “sur place” grounds.