Case summaries
Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83 requires the determining authority, under its duty of cooperation, to obtain up-to-date country of origin information and, where relevant, a medico-legal report on the applicant’s mental health; a breach of that duty does not automatically lead to annulment unless it may have affected the outcome.
Under Directive 2005/85, delays in the asylum procedure cannot be justified by legislative changes and, on their own, do not warrant setting aside a decision absent an impact on the outcome.
Article 4(5)(e) of Directive 2004/83 means that a false statement later explained and withdrawn at the first opportunity does not, by itself, undermine the applicant’s general credibility.
In this case the Upper Tribunal provided that the Refugee Convention doesn’t offer protection from social conservatism and that there is no protected right to enjoy a socially liberal lifestyle. However, the Convention may be considered to apply where ‘westernisation’ reflects a protected characteristic such as political opinion or religious belief, or if there is a real risk that the individual in question would be unable to mask his westernisation and persecutors would impute such protected characteristics to him.
In the context of cessation of refugee status under Article 11 (1)(e), the change in circumstances must remedy the reasons which led to the recognition of refugee status; a country of origin’s ability or inability to demonstrate that it can provide protection from acts of persecution constitutes ‘a crucial element’ in this assessment.
Mere social and financial support to the third country national is inherently incapable of either preventing acts of persecution or of detecting, prosecuting and punishing such acts and, therefore, cannot be regarded as providing the protection required by Article 11(1)(e). In order to determine whether the third-country national still has a well-founded fear of persecution, the existence of protection against acts of persecution should be considered when examining the change in circumstances.
The Supreme Court of Ireland handed down a judgment concerning the question whether the Minister for Justice and Equality is obliged to revoke a deportation order or otherwise facilitate a person to enter the State, when that person has been granted consent to make a subsequent application for international protection under section 22 of the International Protection Act 2015, which requires the person's presence in the State to make the application. It was held that there is no express right to enter the State for the purposes of making an application, save where the person is at its frontiers.
The parents and minor siblings of a Syrian national, who was recognised as a refugee, cannot claim refugee status in terms of international protection for family members, if the beneficiary, although a minor when he was registered as an asylum applicant, was no longer a minor at the time of the court hearing.
The applicant’s complaint is based on the allegation that her father had not left Finland voluntarily but had been forced to return to Iraq because of the decisions already taken by the Finnish authorities. Those decisions, therefore, engaged the responsibility of Finland for having exposed the applicant’s father to a real risk of death, which ended up happening. Finland’s actions amounted to a violation of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.
The CJEU ruled that an asylum applicant may not be transferred under the Dublin III Regulation to the Member State responsible for processing their application if the living conditions would expose them to a situation of extreme material poverty amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR. In this regard, the Court held that the threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions. Correspondingly, national courts had the obligation to examine, based on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated and having regard to the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, whether there was a real risk for the applicant to find himself in such situation of extreme material poverty.
An act of absconding withing the meaning of Dublin III may be presumed when the applicant has left the accommodation allocated to them without informing the competent authorities, provided that they have been informed of this obligation, unless the applicant provides valid reasons for not informing the authorities.
The CJEU ruled that an asylum seeker may not be transferred to the Member State that has previously granted him international protection if such living conditions would expose the applicant to a situation of extreme material poverty. The threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity, going beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions.
The Court further clarified that this threshold also applied where there were infringements of the provisions of the Qualification Directive, including the level of the subsistence allowance granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.
Lastly, the CJEU added that the fact that the Member State that granted subsidiary protection systematically refuses, without real examination, to grant refugee status does not prevent the other Member States from rejecting a further application submitted to them by the person concerned as being inadmissible.
Pursuant to Section 60 paragraph 5 of the Residence Act, refugees recognised abroad cannot be deported to the state in which they are recognised if the living conditions expected there contradict Article 3 of the ECHR. This presupposes that the situation in the country of destination reaches the minimum severity required for Article 3 ECHR, but an "extreme danger" within the meaning of the case-law regarding Section 60 paragraph 7 sentence 5 Residence Act is not a prerequisite.
A Syrian citizen who has been recognised as a refugee in Bulgaria cannot be deported to Bulgaria because of the degrading living conditions awaiting him there.