Case summaries

Given that the Secretary of State used the same materials in the first and in the review decisions, the High Court found that the Secretary of State did not comply with the standard of review in re-evaluating the case at hand.

In this case the Upper Tribunal provided that the Refugee Convention doesn’t offer protection from social conservatism and that there is no protected right to enjoy a socially liberal lifestyle. However, the Convention may be considered to apply where  ‘westernisation’ reflects a protected characteristic such as political opinion or religious belief, or if there is a real risk that the individual in question would be unable to mask his westernisation and persecutors would impute such protected characteristics to him. 

Member States may exclude single permit holders, EU Blue Card holders, and long-term residents from a family discount card scheme, provided the card is not classified as "social security," "social assistance," or "social protection" under national law; such classification would bring such card in the field of application of EU law.

However, such exclusion is precluded for beneficiaries of international protection where the card forms part of a welfare scheme addressing basic needs. Separately, exclusion from housing-related benefits is precluded for long-term residents, single permit holders, and highly qualified workers alike, regardless of the card's classification.

Even in the absence of a formal complaint, the repeated notifications of trafficking elements to authorities and broader awareness of migrant worker abuse reported in international resources (ECRI, GRETA reports) triggered a duty to investigate. However, the Government failed to show any effective investigation took place: no attempts were made to identify or question victims or alleged perpetrators, nor were legal-assistance mechanisms used to gather evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 4 § 2 under its procedural limb.

With regard to the granting of subsidiary protection, the existence of real risks to the rights under Art. 2, 3 ECHR must be examined, which includes the obligation to consider ongoing developments on the basis of available information. If a deterioration of the security situation is disregarded, this could be seen as arbitrariness.

To determine whether there is a violation of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR in the context of expulsion, the Court analyses if the Applicant has presented substantial grounds on (i) whether he faces a real risk of ill-treatment or death in the country of destination, and (ii)whether the national authorities carried out an adequate assessment of the evidence. States have an obligation to analyse the risk ex propio motu when they are aware of facts that could expose an individual to the risk of treatment prohibited by Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.  If the domestic jurisdictions didn’t carry out a proper assessment, the Court analyses the risk on its own on the basis of the parties submissions, international reports and its own findings.

States have an obligation, under Article 5 § 1 ECHR, to act with due diligence and impose a reasonable period of detention pending expulsion. Article 5 § 4 ECHR is breached if detained individuals can’t obtain a revision of their detention before a domestic court. 

The Court decides that the relevant point in time to assess the ‘minor’ status of a beneficiary of international protection under the Qualification Directive is the date on which the applicant makes an (informal) application for international protection.

The Court decides that the notion of ‘family member’ under the Qualification Directive does not require an actual resumption of family life between the parent who benefited international protection and the child. Furthermore, the rights of a family member to claim the benefits under the Qualification Directive persist after the beneficiary of subsidiary protection reaches the age of majority, for the duration of the period of validity of the residence permit granted to them.

New elements or findings which have arisen or have been presented by the applicant in subsequent applications can consist, on the one hand, of those which have arisen after the decision became final, and, on the other hand, of those which have not been presented by the applicant but have already existed during the first procedure.

Domestic provisions regarding the procedures of examining a subsequent application must be compliant with the provisions set out in the Asylum Procedures Directive and cannot foresee a limited period to file a subsequent application. Moreover, if Member States have no specific implementing provisions regarding the Asylum Procedures Directive, domestic legislation is not applicable to dismiss a subsequent application if new elements or findings already existed before the decision became final but where not presented by the applicant’s own fault.

The current case concerns the expulsion of Mr. Arif Savran “the applicant” from Denmark to his country of origin, Turkey in 2015 because of his criminal convictions in Denmark. The applicant argued that his expulsion to Turkey had been in violation of Article 3 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights because he was suffering paranoid schizophrenia and that he was a “settled migrant”.

The Court found that expulsion of the applicant to Turkey did not violate Article 3 under the Paposhvili threshold test, because the evidence was not “capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds” for believing that as a “seriously ill person”, the applicant “would face a real risk… resulting intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy”.  Also, there was no evidence to show that applicant was causing harm to himself.

In relation to the violation of Article 8, the Court found that Danish authorities failed to consider the mental conditions of the applicant and the applicant expulsion to Turkey violated his “private life” under the Article 8 of the Convention.

Sweden’s assessment as regards to the existence of real risk for the applicant suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and schizophrenia was arbitrary and a potential return to Afghanistan would violate the applicant’s rights under Article 15 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.