Case summaries

An applicant from Kosovo claimed persecution due to his homosexuality. His application was rejected. The Administrative Court dismissed the action, but the Supreme court annulled the judgement and returned the case to the new procedure. An act of persecution does not depend on the applicant reporting persecution (in this case rape) to the police of their country of origin. 

The principle of material continuity applies to the transition from one form of aid to another. A family who has been granted international protection should be accomodated in reception centers for refugees until they benefit from financial assistance and a stable private housing, even if it means extending the deadline to fins accommodation that had been given to them following their recognition as refugees.

The applicants are Afghan nationals married religiously in Iran when the first applicant was 14 years old and the second applicant 18 years old. When they applied for asylum in Switzerland a year later, the Swiss authorities did not consider them as being married and the second applicant was subsequently expelled to Italy. They alleged that this expulsion constituted a violation of their Article 8 ECHR right to respect for family life. The Court found that the Swiss government had been justified in finding that they were not married, and held that the decision to expel the second applicant was not a violation of Article 8.

The Council of State requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the compatibility of Belgian Law with Article 5 of Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Directive”). The Directive requires Member States to respect the principle of non-refoulement, as well as ensure that there is a right to an effective remedy.

Under Belgian Law, the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (the “Commissioner”) can dismiss an asylum application and issue an order to leave the territory (“Return Order”), before any judicial appeals or other asylum procedures have been exhausted.

The question in the current case was whether the relevant Belgian legislative provisions were contrary to the Directive. The proceedings were suspended pending a preliminary ruling by the CJEU (C-77/17 and C-78/17). 

A member state may derogate from Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the “Dublin-III-Regulation“), by examining an application for international protection despite the fact that the members state is not responsible for the examination according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin-III-Regulation.

When assessing Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation (the discretionary clause), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (the “Federal Office”) must give priority to the best interest of the child and the right to respect of family life. Furthermore, the Federal Office must take due account of the possibility of family reunification in accordance with Article 6 (3) (a) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

In the event that an application for international protection allows for family reunification and also safeguards the best interests of the child, there is no room for discretion by the Federal Office in making an assessment under Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

Although Article 17 (1) Dublin-III-Regulation determines the responsibility of the Member States to examine applications for international protection, it governs not only the relationship between the Member States but also serves to protect fundamental rights. Thus, it also aims at the protection of the individual and provides for a subjective right, which can be enforced in a court of law. 

The case concerns three unconnected Iranian nationals who unsuccessfully claimed asylum in the Republic of Cyprus then came to the UK where they made asylum claims.  A further right to appeal remained with the Cypriot Supreme Court.  The case is a challenge by the applicants to the SSHD’s refusal to decide their asylum claims substantively; certification of their asylum claims on safe third country grounds; and certification of their human rights claims as clearly unfounded.

The Court concluded that there was no real risk that the applicants, if returned to Iran from Cyprus, would be refouled there and the inclusion of Cyprus on the list of safe third countries involves no incompatibility with the ECHR.  The Court was wholly unpersuaded that there was any flagrant breach of Article 5 in Cyprus for Dublin returnees who have had a final decision on their claim.

Article 33 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with the Geneva Convention, requires Member States to allow persons to whom they have granted subsidiary protection status not only to move freely within their territory but also to choose their place of residence within that territory.  However, the Directive does not prevent beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status from being subject to a residence condition for the purpose of promoting their integration where said group of persons are not in a comparable situation as non-EU citizens. 

A refusal to permit re-unification of family members with a child granted asylum in the United Kingdom can constitute a disproportionate breach of the right to respect for family life enjoyed by all family members under Article 8 ECHR despite the Immigration Rules not providing for family reunification where a child has been granted asylum in the UK.

Same-sex couples are not excluded from the ambit of the Convention’s family life and cohabiting is not a pre-requisite of establishing family life.

A difference in treatment between persons in relevantly similar positions has occurred in this case since the Croatian Aliens Act has made no provision for same-sex couples seeking a residence permit to join their respective partner, whereas it did contain provisions relating to married and unmarried different-sex couples. The applicant had, therefore, experienced a difference in treatment based on her sexual orientation which had not been justified with weight reasons by the Croatian government. Croatia had, thus, violated Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8.

According to § 42 f of the Eighth Book of the Social Security Code, the assessment of whether an applicant is a minor is determined by inspecting  identification papers.  If conclusive identification papers are not available, then the disclosure of information by the person concerned may be taken into account. When in doubt, the determination of age can take the form of a qualified inspection in accordance with § 42 f (1) of the Eighth Book of the Social Security Code. In this respect, one should take into account not only the visual appearance of a person, but also the information obtained during the conversation, which shows the mental age of the person.