Case summaries

After the case has been referred back to the Respondent, it will examine whether the Appellant only formally converted to Christianity and how he might prove that he was also putting his conversion into practice through his life and actions as a result of which his return to Iran would be excluded. In taking evidence on this question, the Respondent must cooperate with persons and bodies that might provide relevant information concerning the Appellant – for example, clergymen, Christian associations, churches and the like.

The Court refused to give two Applicants, who had both been granted asylum by the Czech Republic, permission to seek judicial review of the Refugee Applications Commissioner’s (ORAC) decisions not to admit their asylum claims for consideration on the basis of section 17(4) of the Refugee Act 1996, and also refused similar relief sought in respect of subsequent Deportation Orders, which it was claimed were unlawful owing to the unlawfulness of the former decisions regarding the Applicants’ asylum claims.

The relevant section precludes the Minister from granting a declaration of refugee status to persons who already have asylum pursuant to the Geneva Convention, and whose reason for seeking a declaration in Ireland does not relate to a fear of persecution in that state.

The Court held that they had not provided sufficient evidence that they had suffered or feared persecution for a Convention reason, and neither had they shown that they had taken any steps to avail of the protection of the laws or courts of the Czech Republic, nor provided a reasonable explanation as to why they did not do so.

Both Applicants were also formally refused an extension of time within which to bring their proceedings on the basis that (a) the criteria for the extension of time had not been met and (b) the substantive merits of their applications were insufficient to ground their applications seeking judicial review, even if they had been within time.

Regardless of the parallel extradition proceedings, the Ministry of the Interior is obliged within the proceedings to assess the consequences of prosecution of the Applicant for a criminal offence in the country of origin in the context of fulfilling the conditions for international protection. In case of fear of action by private persons, the possibility and effectiveness of protection provided by the state against such actions is to be assessed.

One cannot accept the position that an Applicant must in every case show that he or she has exhausted all available forms of protection in his or her country of origin. The condition of absence of state protection must not in every case be understood to mean an absolute obligation to exhaust all domestic procedures. The fact that the police, as the Applicant has shown, have no basis upon which to launch an investigation would suggest that the Applicant did apply to the state authorities for protection but that no protection was granted.

Membership of a social group is an objective social fact not dependent on members of the group or, if they are not in a position to do so, their next of kin, expressing their membership of that group.

Acts of a criminal nature cannot be equated with persecution within the meaning of grounds cited under the Convention. Public authorities in the country of origin, which the family of the foreignor did not contact, are supposed to provide protection against risks posed by individual citizens.

1. The issue as to whether an asylum-seeker was already protected against political persecution in a third country is only relevant in terms of  the asylum application for recognition of refugee status in the context of the concept of the first country of asylum as defined in EU law in Article 29 of the Asylum Procedures Act (Articles 25 and 26 of the Asylum Procedures Directive).  

2. If the Federal Office has reached a decision on the asylum application in this case, the substantive question of the subsidiarity of refugee protection in the assessment of refugee status is no longer applicable.

This case concerned the conditions under which a refusal to perform military service for conscientious reasons may justify granting refugee status. The Minister for Public Order did not give reasons for deviating from the competent Committee's recommendation, nor did he find it to be ambiguous or to have any other legal defect, while he could have referred the case back to that body for reassessment. The application for annulment is granted.

This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".

1. The expulsion of a recognised refugee may only take place subject to the requirements of Article 21 (3) in conjunction with (2) and Article 24 (1) of the Qualification Directive.

2. Compelling grounds for public security or order according to Article 24 (1) of the Qualification Directive do not presuppose any outstanding acts of extraordinary danger in support of international terrorism; neither does specific involvement of a sympathiser suffice unless it is characterised by a large degree of continuity and as such shapes and influences the environment of the terrorist organisation.