Case summaries

The applicant appeals the decision to deny asylum and subsidiary protection, made on 26th August 2014 by the Ministry of Interior, on the grounds of fear of racial discrimination in his country of origin. The appeal is denied after an assessment of the facts and circumstances. 

The applicant requested international protection in Spain on 3rd November 2014, having been assaulted in his country of origin because of his sexual orientation. His partner died as a result of the assault. On the 26th October 2015, the Trial Chamber denied his request, stating that the allegations put forward by the applicant were “improbable or insufficient.”

On 18th July 2016, the applicant appealed this decision on two different grounds of appeal. First, on the grounds of an error when applying the relevant procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, mistaking the phase of admission for the phase of concession. And second, on the grounds that the Chamber’s interpretation of the evidence provided was restrictive.

The Chamber granted the appeal against the decision made on 26th October 2015 and this decision was ruled null and void.

The Italian consolidated Law on Migration (Art. 5(6) n. 286/1998) requires humanitarian protection to be given where a person is in a situation of vulnerability. Such a situation occurs when the applicant’s constitutional and international fundamental rights, such as health and nutrition, are compromised.

When a Member State accepts a request by Germany to take charge of an applicant in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (the “Dublin II Regulation”), the applicant may be transferred to that Member State even if he/she limits his/her application to subsidiary protection after the request to take charge has been accepted.

In case of conflict between a domestic and international norm the Court is obliged to adhere to the latter and set aside the former. Given the well-established right to an effective remedy in international and European instruments, an element of which relates to the remedy’s timeliness, the court is obliged to remake the OIN’s subsidiary protection decision and provide the applicant with refugee status. This conclusion applies notwithstanding that domestic legislation prohibits the Court from reforming an OIN decision. To abide by this legislation would result in a never-ending appeal procedure thereby rendering the remedy ineffective.

Article 33 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with the Geneva Convention, requires Member States to allow persons to whom they have granted subsidiary protection status not only to move freely within their territory but also to choose their place of residence within that territory.  However, the Directive does not prevent beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status from being subject to a residence condition for the purpose of promoting their integration where said group of persons are not in a comparable situation as non-EU citizens. 

When addressing asylum claims, refugee status must be recognised when there is a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons foreseen in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Assessment of an asylum request fundamentally needs careful consideration of the facts and personal circumstances of the asylum seeker, as well as an analysis of the nature of the risk. The criteria of this test does not have to be restrictive, it is sufficient that the competent authority has a rational belief that the requirements are met for the purpose of receiving refugee status.

The rules of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (“International Protection Directive”) do not prohibit the review of an application for asylum in Germany in a case where an applicant has previously been granted subsidiary protection in another Member State, if such application for asylum has been filed before 20 July 2015. This is because the inadmissibility of applications filed before 20 July 2015 is governed by the Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (“Asylum Procedures Directive”). According to Article 25 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, Member States may consider an application for asylum as inadmissible if another Member State has granted refugee status, but not if another Member State has granted subsidiary protection. 

Termination of an applicant’s international protection status (ie where there is a change or termination of protection grounds) must be examined against the principle of non-refoulement, which ensures the right to a fair and efficient procedure in which the Asylum authority assesses if non-refoulement would be violated where protection ceases.

It results from the principle of non-refoulement that the applicant in proceedings on termination of subsidiary protection must have the possibility to state all the reasons for which subsidiary protection should not cease.

In the process of renewal of subsidiary protection all the guarantees provided by Article 18 of the Constitution (Prohibition of Torture) should be respected.

Legislation which limited the assessment of the competent authority in the subsidiary protection renewal procedure only to the grounds based on which an individual has been granted subsidiary protection, is inconsistent with the right set out in Article 18 of the Constitution.

The degree of indiscriminate violence in certain parts of Iraq was such as to expose persons to a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive merely due to their presence there.

However, other areas of the country (including Baghdad City) did not meet this threshold, and as such, Iraqi nationals could be forcibly returned to these areas as it would not generally be unreasonable or unduly harsh for them to internally relocate there.