Case summaries
1. An application for asylum lodged in Germany only qualifies as a subsequent application within the meaning of section 71a of the Asylum Act, interpreted in conformity with the constitution, if the first asylum procedure in a country that is generally determined to be a safe third country has actually been conducted in compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This is not the case, where, at the time of the decision, there have been systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedures of the third country which have put the applicant at risk of an inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 3 of the ECHR.
2. The procedure to determine whether a second asylum procedure is to be conducted also requires a personal interview of the applicant. Such an interview is only dispensable where the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (Federal Office) can either decide on the basis of the information received on the merits of the decision whether the new application constitutes a new submission or assess already on the basis of the detailed written explanations of the applicant reliably and safely that the submission is clearly and manifestly inconsistent.
Based on the principle of effectiveness, the CJEU ruled that a limit of 15 days to apply for subsidiary protection following a notification of the decision not to grant refugee status is particularly short and cannot be justified by the need to ensure an effective return procedure. The limited period endangers applicants’ ability to submit an application for subsidiary protection.
Arranging for medical or psychological examination is required, for example, when the third country national indicates that they were subject to violence, which left physical or mental signs which can be confirmed by medical or psychological examination. Not all invoked health problems will require an exam. Moreover, in subsequent proceedings this obligation is limited. The authority has no basis to arrange for such an examination when the event indicated in the subsequent application related to violence which was already subject to examination in the first asylum proceedings and was considered to not be credible.
The applicant arrived in Hungary as a child and her affiliation with Falun Gong was not properly adjudicated by the asylum authority (OIN) but her asylum application made as an adult was considered a subsequent one. Relying on Article 5 (3) of the Recast Qualification Directive, the OIN considered that the applicant and her mother were malevolent when joining Falun gong solely to evoke their sur place status. The court ruled that the OIN failed to individually assess the applicant’s claim and quashed the decision.
The Federal Administrative Court (the “Court”) suspended its decision and referred the case to the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) pursuant to Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) to obtain a preliminary ruling with regards to the following question:
Do the provisions of Regulation No. 604/2013 (“Dublin-III-Regulation”)
i) the obligation of a Member State to (re-)file a request to take back the applicant with another Member State; and
ii) the possible transfer of the responsibility for examining an application,
apply in relation to an applicant who has been deported to the Member State where he had first entered the EU and illegally re-enters the Member State that had filed the request to take back and deported the applicant.
The 6-month period under Art. 29 (1) Dublin-III -Regulation begins after the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the person concerned has been accepted or the fiction of such acceptance (Art. 29(1) first alternative) or of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3) (Art. 29(1) second alternative). In the second case, the later event determines when the time limit begins to run, unless the time limit for the transfer triggered by the acceptance of the request to take back or to take charge has already expired. In such a case, the latter event is decisive to determine when the period begins, unless the 6-month period triggered by the (deemed) acceptance had already expired.
When a Member State accepts a request by Germany to take charge of an applicant in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (the “Dublin II Regulation”), the applicant may be transferred to that Member State even if he/she limits his/her application to subsidiary protection after the request to take charge has been accepted.
A member state may derogate from Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the “Dublin-III-Regulation“), by examining an application for international protection despite the fact that the members state is not responsible for the examination according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin-III-Regulation.
When assessing Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation (the discretionary clause), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (the “Federal Office”) must give priority to the best interest of the child and the right to respect of family life. Furthermore, the Federal Office must take due account of the possibility of family reunification in accordance with Article 6 (3) (a) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.
In the event that an application for international protection allows for family reunification and also safeguards the best interests of the child, there is no room for discretion by the Federal Office in making an assessment under Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.
Although Article 17 (1) Dublin-III-Regulation determines the responsibility of the Member States to examine applications for international protection, it governs not only the relationship between the Member States but also serves to protect fundamental rights. Thus, it also aims at the protection of the individual and provides for a subjective right, which can be enforced in a court of law.
The case concerns three unconnected Iranian nationals who unsuccessfully claimed asylum in the Republic of Cyprus then came to the UK where they made asylum claims. A further right to appeal remained with the Cypriot Supreme Court. The case is a challenge by the applicants to the SSHD’s refusal to decide their asylum claims substantively; certification of their asylum claims on safe third country grounds; and certification of their human rights claims as clearly unfounded.
The Court concluded that there was no real risk that the applicants, if returned to Iran from Cyprus, would be refouled there and the inclusion of Cyprus on the list of safe third countries involves no incompatibility with the ECHR. The Court was wholly unpersuaded that there was any flagrant breach of Article 5 in Cyprus for Dublin returnees who have had a final decision on their claim.
The Council of State (the “Council”) overturned an order of the National Court of Asylum (the “NCA”) rejecting a request for annulment of a decision of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (the “OFPRA”) rejecting the Applicant’s request for refugee status or subsidiary protection. The reasoning for the rejection by the NCA was that no new elements had been presented since the previous decision that had been given.
The Council considered that the disclosure by the prefecture to the Sri Lankan Embassy in France (the “Embassy”) of information on the French asylum request of the Applicant constituted a new circumstance which justified a review of the Applicant’s asylum request.
The Court found a violation of Article 3 in relation to a subsequent application for asylum, which had been rejected on the basis that it contained no new elements indicating that the Applicants ran a real risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment on deportation to Russia. Because new information had in fact been provided, the national authorities were under an obligation to thoroughly review the information in order to assure themselves that the Applicants’ rights under Article 3 would be safeguarded.