Case summaries
The Appellant and the appellant’s children were applying for leave to remain in Sweden due to affiliation with their husband and father respectively who had been granted a permanent right of residency in Sweden as a refugee - despite them not being able to prove their identities. Due to the appellant’s lack of relevant documentation for her and the children, the court had to consider the circumstances in which a person can be granted alleviation of evidentiary burden in terms of proving their identity.
The Migration Court of Appeal granted the appeal and held that the appellant and the children would be granted an alleviation of evidentiary burden. It further referred the case back to the Swedish Migration Agency who would have to complete a DNA-test aimed at establishing the kinship of the family and subsequently try the case again.
The complainant, an Ethnic Arab and Sunni Muslim from Damascus, Syria, was granted temporary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (3).
On 1 March 2017, the complainant lodged a complaint claiming refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).
The Board accepted that the complainant, who did not want to be redrafted into the Syrian Army, if he returned to Syria, would be at risk of being recalled to military service and therefore at specific and individual risk of persecution covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1). Consequently, the complainant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).
The complainant is a Sunni Muslim from Mogadishu, Somalia. In July 2015 the Danish Immigration Service decided that his subsidiary protection status under the Danish Aliens Act. Art. 7 (2) had lapsed according to the Danish Aliens Act Art. 17 (1) and (4). The Refugee Appeals Board did not consider that the Danish Immigrations Service had lifted its burden of proof according to the Danish Aliens Act Art 17 (4). Consequently, the Board granted the complainant continued subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2).
The National Court for the Right of Asylum (CNDA) has a responsibility to follow the general rules on closing files. Where this is not done, the Court can be found negligent.
The use of forged documents by asylum seekers, when attempting to flee from one country and seek protection under international law in another country, is not criminally liable, when it is the result of a well-founded fear for inhuman or degrading treatment.
The Tribunal reasserted the decision maker’s duty of confidentiality in considering documents produced in support of a protection claim. Where there is a needed to make an inquiry in the country of origin then written consent must be given by the applicant. Moreover, Article 22 of the Asylum Procedures Directive prohibits direct contact with the alleged actor of persecution. Additionally, the Refugee Convention requires that the authentication of a document is undertaken with a precautionary approach, namely whether an inquiry is necessary or should be framed in a specific manner and whether there is a safer alternative. Ultimately, disclosure of personal information should go no further than is strictly necessary.
The Tribunal found that the respondent was unlikely to have breached confidentiality in her inquiries into the authenticity of the documents produced; and that if she had, the remedy would not be the grant of refugee status; and that the appellant had not established that he had a credible case for asylum on the basis of the documents submitted. Nonetheless the Tribunal highlighted that a failure to comply with the duty of confidentiality might be relevant to the overall assessment of risk on return.
Following the appeal of the Children’s Rights Ombudsman, the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the order of the Regional Administrative Court, in relation to a challenge to the decision of the Polish Refugee Board, and set aside the aforementioned decision to refuse tolerated stay, dismissing the appeal in all other respects.
The court justified its decision with reference to the procedural errors of the Polish Refugee Board, which included failing to gather evidence in an appropriate manner and inappropriately establishing the facts relating to the Applicant’s children.
The application of S.C. and her minor children Z.C. and F.C. related to the cassation of an Appeal Court judgement regarding compensation for the harm they suffered as a result of an indisputably unjust decision to place the Applicants in a Guarded Detention Centre for Foreigners. The Supreme Court reversed the challenged judgement and passed the case to the Appeal Court for re-consideration.
The applicant, an ethnic Al-Bagal and Sunni Muslim from Moraya, Nyala, Darfur, Sudan feared imprisonment or execution by the Sudanese authorities. According to the applicant’s account he had been imprisoned for alleged political activities for a total of 18 months during which he was tortured. Subsequently, he was regularly harassed by the Intelligence Service.
The Danish Immigration Service rejected the asylum application in July 2016.
On 29 November 2016, the Refugee Appeals Board upheld the decision of the Danish Immigration Service. The majority of the Board did not find to a sufficient degree that a torture examination would be of essential importance for deciding the case.
The Refugee Appeals Board resumed the case based on a forensic report presented by the applicant. The Board now referring to the forensic report accepted that the applicant had been exposed to torture. The Board thus found that the applicant, to a sufficient degree, had rendered probable that he, if returning to Sudan, was at risk of persecution and granted the applicant refugee status according to the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).
The Immigration Rules (“the Rules”) minimum income requirements (“the MIR”) for individuals who have a right to live in the UK who wish to bring their non-EEA citizen spouses to live with them are not open to legal challenge.
The Rules fail unlawfully to give effect to the duty of the Secretary of State (“the SoS”) in respect of the welfare of children under s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”), however the challenge to the validity of the Rules was dismissed.
To ensure that their decisions are compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”) however, revisions to instructions for entry clearance officers (“the Instructions”) are necessary.