Case summaries

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer the applicant to Hungary on the ground that Hungary would transfer the applicant to Serbia, which would amount to indirect refoulement in violation of Article 3 ECHR. The Asylum Court allowed the appeal and held that, although Hungary can be assumed as a safe country, if an applicant gives individual reasons for why Hungary is not safe these must be examined in detail. 

Two main issues are addressed by the Court:

Is the Minister required to re-examine a negative credibility finding by the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) when such is disputed in the subsidiary protection application but has not been the subject of an appeal determination by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) in the refugee status determination procedure?

Does Regulation 4(5) preclude the Minister from taking any steps in the preparation of a deportation order prior to a final determination of the subsidiary protection application?

Both issues are answered by the Court in the negative.

In the opinion of the Court, generally accepted principles of administrative procedure such as the right of a participant to be heard, the right to comment on the basis for a decision, the right to present evidence in support of one’s claims in a procedure and the right to be informed of the grounds for an administrative act (Resolution 77(31) of the Committee of Minister of the Council of Europe of 28 September 1977) must not be disregarded in the case in question.

French associations challenged an internal memo from the OFPRA (3 November 2011). The Council of State suspended the execution of that memo.

The Court quashed a country guidance decision on the application of Art 15(c) of the Qualification Directive in Iraq because the Tribunal had not considered what was necessary to ensure that it heard proper argument in a case designed to give binding guidance for other applicants.

According to the residence permit application, the Applicant, born in 1935, has various ailments and he is fully dependent on his daughter who lives in Finland and is a Finnish citizen.  In an interim order, the Administrative Court turned down the Applicant’s non-refoulement argument  and held that judgment would be made on the substantive issue at a later date.  While the substantive issue was still pending at the Administrative Court seeking a stay on the execution of the interim order so that he would not to be deported while the Administrative Court decided on the substantive issue (a ‘repeal’ application).  As according to national legal provisions, a repeal application can only be made on a judgment  which has entered into force, the repeal application was inadmissible. Administrative Court, the Applicant applied to the Supreme

Because the failure to accept the non-refoulement argument might render the appeal on the substantive issue de facto ineffective, in order to guarantee the Applicant’s legal protection, in exceptional circumstances there was reason to carry out a review to determine whether his appeal should be handled  by the Supreme Administrative Court without it being detrimental to the final decision under Section 58 of the Administrative Procedure Act and Section 199 Article 2 of the Aliens Act. 

Because the Asylum Court refused the appeal only one day after service of the ruling on the appointment of a legal advisor, the Applicant was not granted an appropriate period of time to use the legal advice and any representation in the proceedings and it was therefore made impossible for him to exercise his rights effectively in the proceedings.

M’s detention pending deportation, for over 2 years and 8 months, was processed without sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness and delay, resulting in four separate violations of the Convention.

Conversion to Christianity led to a re-examination of impediments to enforcement.

This was a decision on an injunction application in the course of judicial review proceedings challenging a subsidiary protection decision and deportation order on the basis of a failure by the Minister to cooperate with the applicant in processing the subsidiary protection application and that the failure to provide a mechanism of appeal against a refusal of subsidiary protection  breaches the principal of equivalence in European Union law in that the procedure under the (Irish) 2006 Regulations is inferior to that provided for in national law (the Refugee Act 1996 as amended) in respect of decisions on claims for asylum.

The (injunction) application was rejected on the basis that it was only since the requirements of the Procedures Directive, and, in particular, the deeming provision of its Annex 1, became effective in Irish law (in 2007) that the recommendation of the Commissioner fell to be considered as the first instance determination by a “determining authority” with an appeal to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. Thus, insofar as the provisions of the 1996 Act can now be pointed to as providing a two-stage determination for an asylum application including a right to an effective remedy by way of appeal, it is only because of the manner in which the State has adapted the arrangements of the 1996 Act in order to comply with the requirements of the Procedures Directive for asylum (refugee) applications pursuant to Article 3.1. Furthermore, without a unified system for both applications the minimum procedural standards provide for in the Procedures Directive do not apply to a separate and discrete subsidiary protection application.

In relation to the ‘co-operation’ point the Court found that a claim of non-compliance with such a duty of “co-operation” or the principle audi alteram partem cannot be made as a purely academic point divorced from specific facts. The applicant in this case eschewed the need to identify any particular finding in the Subsidiary Protection determination which might have been corrected or altered had the applicant been consulted upon it.

Unlike the Procedures Directive, Article 4.1 of the Qualifications Directive refers to the duty of co-operation in respect of the “application for international protection,” that is, the claim to asylum and the claim to subsidiary protection. Article 14.2 of the Procedures Directive recognises, however, that the report of the personal interview with the applicant on which the decision of the determining authority on an asylum application is based, may be communicated to the asylum seeker after the decision has been adopted. The Court found that it would be inconsistent with these arrangements that the duty of cooperation in Article 4.1 should be construed as imposing on a determining authority a mandatory obligation to submit either the report or a draft decision in relation to a subsidiary protection application to an applicant for prior comment. Furthermore, the duty to co-operate provided for in Article 4.1only applies to those elements of the claim described in Article 4.2. These are, in effect, the basic facts and documents relating to the applicant’s personal history and to the basis of the claim and they are primarily considered and assessed in the asylum process including any appeal.