Case summaries

The application of S.C. and her minor children Z.C. and F.C. related to the cassation of an Appeal Court judgement regarding compensation for the harm they suffered as a result of an indisputably unjust decision to place the Applicants in a Guarded Detention Centre for Foreigners. The Supreme Court reversed the challenged judgement and passed the case to the Appeal Court for re-consideration. 

Even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible, a Dublin transfer can only be carried out in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR EU.

If there is a real and proven risk that the state of health of an applicant who suffers from a serious mental or physical illness would significantly and permanently deteriorate, that transfer would constitute a violation of Article 4 CFR EU.

It is for the courts and authorities of the requesting Member State to eliminate any serious doubts concerning the impact of the transfer on the health of the person concerned by taking all necessary precaution. If the taking of precautions is not sufficient, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to suspend the execution of the transfer for as long as the applicant’s conditions render him unfit for transfer.

Member States may choose to conduct its own examination of that person’s application by making use of the “discretionary clause” laid down in Article 17(1) DRIII, but is not required to do so.

The right to be heard does not require, as a rule, that, where national legislation provides for two separate procedures for examining applications for refugee status and applications for subsidiary protection, the applicant for subsidiary protection is to have the right to an interview relating to his application and the right to call or cross-examine witnesses when that interview takes place. However, an interview must be arranged where specific circumstances render it necessary in order to examine an application with full knowledge of the facts.

In some cases of severe illness Art. 3 ECHR precludes a deportation even though a treatment in the state of origin is possible. If the appellant cannot bear the costs of the treatment or the necessary concomitant medication the renewed increase of the illness and therefore a real life-threatening risk is probable which precludes the deportation of the applicant. 

The applicants’ detention under Article 5 (1) was arbitrary and did not ensure the principle of legal certainty; lack of information was contrary to Article 5 (2) and impaired their ability to challenge the detention decisions in violation of 5 (4). The conditions at the reception centre and the boats did not amount to a violation of Article 3, as the applicants’ stay was very short and there were not sufficient indications.

There was no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4, as the applicants have had a genuine and effective possibility during the entire procedure to raise concerns regarding obstacles to their return to Tunisia; there was similarly no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 in conjunction with Article 13, since the applicants’ complain would solely relate on the collective nature of their expulsion and not to any real risk of treatment contrary to Article 2 & 3 in Tunisia.

This case dealt with the extent to which in the case of a child the prospect of discrimination could amount to a real risk of persecution sufficient to found a successful asylum claim in a situation where a comparably placed adult would not be at such a risk. 

In the course of an asylum procedure, the statements of the asylum seeker have to be assessed integrally. This includes, inter alia, an analysis of (up-to-date) country reports. However, such analysis is not carried out in a sufficient manner where there are only superficial references to the country of origin information. Rather, it is required that the information contained is actually taken into consideration when taking the decision, applied to the specific circumstances of each case and compared to the information provided by the asylum seeker(s).

If this is not the case, there are significant deficiencies in the administrative inquiry and the facts relevant for the decision are not fully established. Therefore, the contested decisions are to be annulled and the matters are to be referred back to the competent authorities for new decisions to be issued since there is no sufficient basis for a decision of an administrative court. 

The French National Asylum Court (CNDA) must do a complete assessment of facts and circumstances in deciding whether an applicant should be granted refugee status, or failing that, subsidiary protection. In doing so, it must take into account all the documentation provided by the Applicant in support of the application. In this case, the Applicant’s medical evidence documentation and the evidence relating to the potential risks she is likely to face if she returns to her country (fear of persecution due to imputed political opinions) should have been taken into account.

The CNDA did not consider that evidence and did not include it in its decision.

The applicant had sufficiently established that if returned to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation he would not benefit from an examination of his asylum application in line with procedural guarantees as required by the right to asylum. Such a transfer decision thus violated Article 4 of the Charter.

The transfer of asylum seekers from Belgium to Austria, under the Dublin Regulation, is contrary to the principle of due diligence, because the government has failed to obtain information on the effects of the moratorium of the processing of asylum applications in Austria.