Case summaries

1. A change of the destination country in a return decision by an administrative authority should be regarded as a new return decision requiring an effective remedy in compliance with Article 47 CFREU.

2. The national legislation providing for a safe transit country ground applicable in the present case is contrary to EU law.

3. The obligation imposed on a third-country national to remain permanently in a closed and limited transit zone, within which their movement is limited and monitored, and which the latter cannot legally leave voluntarily, in any direction whatsoever, constitutes a deprivation of liberty, characterised as "detention" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions (RCD) and Returns Directives (RD).

4. Neither the RCD nor Article 43 of the Asylum Procedures Directive authorise detention in transit zones for a period exceeding four weeks.

5. Detention under the RCD and the RD must comply with the relevant guarantees under EU law including being based on a reasoned detention decision; consisting of a measure of last resort, following an individualised assessment of the case, its necessity and proportionality; and effective judicial review should be available. An applicant for international protection cannot be held in detention solely on the ground that they cannot support themselves. Where detention is found to contravene EU law, domestic courts may release the applicant and order the authorities to provide accommodation in line with the RCD provisions. They are empowered to do so, even if they have no clear jurisdiction under national law.

The detention of children is, in principle, permitted under Article 5 ECHR for the shortest amount of time, in appropriate conditions and facilities, and only after the Government has correctly concluded that less coercive measures are unavailable.

The complaint of the applicants under Article 3 are manifestly unfounded.

The Court concluded on the immediate release of an Egyptian national from detention. The judgment referred to the detention conditions for vulnerable persons that suffer from serious health conditions during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Due to the COVID-19 health crisis, and especially the cancellation of flights to the applicant’s country of origin, the continuation of immigration detention is no longer required because an effective return cannot be considered anymore as a reasonable perspective.  

In the midst of the health crisis, the judge of liberty and detention of the Lille Judicial Tribunal considered that the health risk for the Applicant as well as for a third party, generated by the extension of the administrative detention was disproportionate to the perspectives of return. Especially since most countries had closed their borders.

As a result, the judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the Applicant’s detention.

The Judge of the liberty and detention of the Nice Judicial Tribunal declared irregular the procedure during which the applicant was notified of his administrative detention more than an hour after the end of his police interrogation.

The Judge considered that the deprivation of liberty during that time had no legal foundation.

The administrative detention of an Afghan national was imposed on the basis of a procedural error due  to the lack of relevant documentation and unjustified information by the French authorities (Prefect and Prosecutor).

Confinement of asylum applicants in an airport transit zone is contrary to Art. 5 § 1 (f) in the absence of any domestic legal basis for the applicants’ deprivation of liberty.

Confinement of asylum seekers left to their own devices in airport transit zones under the control of border authorities, without unimpeded access to shower or cooking facilities, outdoor exercise and medical or social assistance amount to degrading and inhuman conditions under Art. 3 ECHR if protracted for a long time. 

When State Parties do not examine an application for international protection in its mertis based on a safe third country clause, Article 3 still requires that they apply a thorough and comprehensive legal procedure to assess the existence of such risk by looking into updated sources regarding the situation in the receiving third country. Hungary violated Article 3 by failing to conduct an efficient and adequate assessment when applying the safe third country clause for Serbia.

Article 5 cannot be considered as ratione materiae applicable to the Röszke transit zone; the applicants' stay there involved a short waiting time in order for Hungary to verify their right to enter, they had entered on their own initiative and they were free to leave the area in the direction of Serbia. The conditions in the transit zone were not found to breach Article 3 because of the restrictive measure's short duration, the possibility for human contact and the applicants' awareness of the procedure.

The Court ruled that the material conditions of detention exceeded Article 3 ECHR threshold and that the detention of children in such conditions, even for short periods, is also contrary to that Article. It also held that the complaint procedures that were indeed available to the applicants were ineffective, amounting to a violation of Article 13 ECHR.