Case summaries

When a refugee and their child apply for international protection, the Police Headquarters shall not make residence or parental relationship the conditions for submitting their application.

The use of forged documents by asylum seekers, when attempting to flee from one country and seek protection under international law in another country, is not criminally liable, when it is the result of a well-founded fear for inhuman or degrading treatment.

Internal borders of the EU Schengen zone can be crossed without submitting persons to any border control. However it does not mean that a third country national is not subject to any requirements while crossing the border. Interpretation of the Schengen Border Code, the Convention applying the Schengen Agreement and the Law on Foreigners leads to a conclusion that the third country national should hold a passport and a residence card while crossing the border. Holding these documents beyond doubt means possessing them, ie carrying them.

The Federal Administrative Court (the “Court”) suspended its decision and referred the case to the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) pursuant to Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) to obtain a preliminary ruling with regards to the following question:

Do the provisions of Regulation No. 604/2013 (“Dublin-III-Regulation”) 

i)  the obligation of a Member State to (re-)file a request to take back the applicant with another Member State; and

ii) the possible transfer of the responsibility for examining an application,

apply in relation to an applicant who has been deported to the Member State where he had first entered the EU and illegally re-enters the Member State that had filed the request to take back and deported the applicant.

The 6-month period under Art. 29 (1) Dublin-III -Regulation begins after the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the person concerned has been accepted or the fiction of such acceptance (Art. 29(1) first alternative) or of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3) (Art. 29(1) second alternative). In the second case, the later event determines when the time limit begins to run, unless the time limit for the transfer triggered by the acceptance of the request to take back or to take charge has already expired. In such a case, the latter event is decisive to determine when the period begins, unless the 6-month period triggered by the (deemed) acceptance had already expired. 

The Court found that Article 4 had been violated because of delay by national authorities in formally recognising that the Applicant was a victim of human trafficking, and because of failings of the police and the courts in prosecuting the individuals suspected of being responsible. Further, Articles 6(1) and 13 had been violated because of delays in the length of criminal proceedings against those individuals, and because the Applicant did not have recourse to an effective remedy to complain about this.

Whilst the Long Term Residence Directive (LTRD) allows for the imposition of fees relating to the issuance of a residence permit such measures must adhere to the principles of proportionality and abide by the Directive’s effectiveness.

The frequent payment of a fee which is on top of a pre-existing fee creates an obstacle to the obtaining of the long-term resident status conferred by the LTRD. 

The right to be heard prior to the adoption of a return decision, implies that the administrative authority places the foreign national in a position to present, in a useful and effective manner, his point of view on the illegality of his residency and the motives which will be likely to justify the authorities abstaining from taking a return decision.

It does not, however, imply that the administration has the obligation to put the interested person in a position to present his observations in a manner specific to the decision obliging him to leave French territory or on the decision of placing him in detention pending the execution of the expulsion measure as long as he has been heard on the illegality of his residence or the prospect of expulsion

The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the ground that he qualified for subsidiary protection under Article 2(e) and (f) of the Qualification Directive and was therefore entitled to a residence permit under Article 24(2) of the Qualification Directive.

In dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal found that: (a) Article 24 of the Qualification Directive does not confer a substantive right of residence in the member state concerned but rather its function is to determine the modalities whereby a right of residence otherwise existing is to be documented, and (b) the Procedures Directive is a truly adjectival instrument of EU legislation which does not create any substantive rights in the realm of asylum or subsidiary protection.

The right to be represented by a lawyer in the context of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 will only apply when an appeal to a return decision has been lodged and free legal assistance will be subject to national domestic legislation. 

A stateless Palestinian woman from Syria who was registered with the UNRWA but who was no longer receiving support from the organisation was granted refugee status by the Migration Court of Appeal, and the case was returned to the Swedish Migration Board for re-examination of the period of validity of the residence permit.