Case summaries

Neither the Applicant, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the decision, nor her parents had submitted reasons for persecution specifically relevant to the Applicant in the proceedings at the court of first instance or in the appeal. Despite this, the Asylum Court reached the conclusion – amongst other things after a personal hearing of the Applicant – that the Applicant would be persecuted directly by the state or privately in Afghanistan owing to her membership of a particular social group and the religious-political attitude to which she would be subjected. In doing so the Asylum Court applied child specific considerations.

In addition, the Court stated that group persecution was to be assumed with regard to Afghan women.

Persecution at the hands of political authorities acting for political reasons and with a political objective although not arising from the actual or imputed opinions of the individual concerned.

The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.

This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".

The fears of an Applicant originating from a refugee camp near Tindouf were considered with regard to the Self-Proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), taken as a de facto authority. 

The Syrian Kurdish Applicant has been persecuted and tortured for his nationality and imputed political opinion.

An Ethiopian man was considered eligible for protection as a refugee due to his involvement in the government-hostile OLF guerilla group, which has been declared a terrorist organisation.

Tibetans in China are not at risk of “group persecution” based on their ethnicity. However, individual acts of persecution (the rape of a Tibetan woman by security forces in the present case) do constitute past persecution since they have to be regarded as being connected to the persecution ground “race”.

Since the situation of generalised violence which prevailed in Sri Lanka ended with the military defeat of LTTE combatants in May 2009, the only valid ground for claiming subsidiary protection would be Article L.712-1 b) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive]. The applicant has to establish an individual risk of persecution or ill-treatment in case of return to his/her country of origin.

The applicant, from Iran, had not been politically active in Iran but participated in demonstrations in Sweden and appeared with his photo on dissident websites and TV. The applicant was considered to have been engaged in low-level political activity. Thus, he was deemed not to be of interest to the Iranian authorities and was therefore not considered to be a refugee or in need of subsidiary protection on “sur place” grounds.