Case summaries
A potential violation of Art. 3 of the Convention can be found when a person risks to be extradited to a country where practice of ill-treatment of detainees are reported by reliable sources, notwithstanding possible assurances by the involved public prosecutors of that country.
Given the irreversible and particular serious nature of the harm which might occur if risks relevant under art. 3 of the Convention materialise, an effective remedy to avoid such a harm within the meaning of art. 13 of the Convention requires both an independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim, and a remedy with automatic suspensive effect.
The Applicant’s fear that he will be forced to fight against persons of the same nationality as part of the compulsory military service may, regarding a particular country of origin and specific nationality, represent a well-founded fear of persecution relevant to asylum.
The practices used by the authorities of a given country in order to exclude some citizens, members of a minority, from nationality can be considered as persecution since they are linked to one of the grounds listed in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
The decision of the asylum authority was annulled on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that an internal protection alternative existed.
The Court examined the issue of when the refusal of the applicant’s State of nationality to provide documents to allow her to be readmitted to that State represents a denial of the applicant’s nationality and, consequently, provides a basis for a claim for asylum. The Court held that the deprivation of nationality can constitute persecution. It further held that concepts of de jure and de facto nationality, applied by the Tribunal in the appeal, were likely to obscure the question of whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution. It held that the correct standard of proof in respect of the issue of re-documentation will usually be the balance of probabilities rather than a reasonable degree of likelihood. It further held that, to prove her case, the applicant was under a duty to take all reasonable steps in good faith to obtain documents from the authorities of her State of nationality.
Turkey’s continual and severe failure to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of disappearance of Greek-Cypriots, who were at the time under the control of its agents, constituted a violation of Articles 2,3 and 5 of the ECHR. The circumscription of freedom of movement, religion and association of Greek-Cypriots in Northern Greece constituted violations of Articles 9 and 10 and the continual violation of Article 1 Protocol 1 by virtue of preventing Greek Cypriot owners from having access to, control and use of their property was also found by the Court.
The issue of an applicant’s nationality is integral to a claim for refugee status. In the great majority of asylum applications the nationality of the applicant is not in issue, but when it is put in doubt decision-makers must address it. Failure to do so would offend the nationality logic that underlies the refugee definition set out in Art 1A(2). The burden of proof in respect of nationality is on the applicant although the evidential burden may shift.
The Court of Appeal held that an asylum-seeker unable to return to his country of origin may indeed be entitled to recognition as a refugee provided only that the fear or actuality of past persecution still plays a causative part in his or her presence here. Further, the refusal of the State of nationality to permit return can constitute persecution.
Mrs Loizidou argued that the refusal by Turkish troops to allow her access to property she claimed to own in northern Cyprus violated her right to peaceful enjoyment of her property. The Court held that Turkey could be held responsible for what was a continuing violation of the right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.