Case summaries

1. Afghans who have worked for international aid organisations are particularly endangered of becoming victims of political persecution by non-state actors (e.g. Taliban) according to § 3 (1) AsylG in case of a return to Afghanistan.

2. There is no internal protection for these people. They cannot escape the clutches of non-state actors as these groups have a wide (information) network at their disposal and an increased interest in persons who have worked for international aid organisations.

The applicant, an ethnic Somali and a Sunni Muslim belonging to the Darood Clan and Ogaden Sub-Clan, was born and raised in Libya. 

The Board found that the applicant was, as her parents and siblings, a Somali citizen. Further, considering that Somali was not the applicant’s mother tongue, that she only with difficulty was able to speak, read or write in this language, that she in reality had never been to Somalia, that she does not know anyone in this country, and is a single mother with a son of five years old, the Board found that, in accordance with the ECtHR judgement R.H. v. Sweden, she would face a real risk of living in conditions constituting inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR. The Board therefore granted her subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2).

Article 3 ECHR is triggered in cases involving the removal of a seriously ill individual where the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, exposes the individual to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.

Access to sufficient and appropriate medical care must be available in reality, not merely in theory and the impact of removal on an applicant must be assessed by considering how an applicant’s condition would evolve after transfer to the receiving State.

The applicant appeals the decision to deny asylum and subsidiary protection, made on 26th August 2014 by the Ministry of Interior, on the grounds of fear of racial discrimination in his country of origin. The appeal is denied after an assessment of the facts and circumstances. 

The applicant requested international protection in Spain on 3rd November 2014, having been assaulted in his country of origin because of his sexual orientation. His partner died as a result of the assault. On the 26th October 2015, the Trial Chamber denied his request, stating that the allegations put forward by the applicant were “improbable or insufficient.”

On 18th July 2016, the applicant appealed this decision on two different grounds of appeal. First, on the grounds of an error when applying the relevant procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, mistaking the phase of admission for the phase of concession. And second, on the grounds that the Chamber’s interpretation of the evidence provided was restrictive.

The Chamber granted the appeal against the decision made on 26th October 2015 and this decision was ruled null and void.

This case is concerned with whether the decision to deny the asylum application and the subsequently imposed entry ban were justified based on articles 1F(a)-(c). Under these provisions the Secretary of State can raise national security as a ‘serious ground’ for his decision if an element of ‘personal participation’ can be proven.

This case is concerned with whether the Secretary of State for Justice has discharged or breached his duty of care with regards to the risk of refoulement in an asylum application.

A person, with a well-founded fear, within the meaning of the Geneva Convention, of being harmed by their family if they return to their country of origin because they are a member of a particular social group and are unable to rely on effective protection from the state, may be entitled to claim refugee status.  

The case follows on from litigation presented in M.A. v Cyprus and focuses in on the legal grounds for detention in Cyprus for an applicant who is subject to removal as well as an individual’s right to speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention. 

The right to be heard prior to the adoption of a return decision, implies that the administrative authority places the foreign national in a position to present, in a useful and effective manner, his point of view on the illegality of his residency and the motives which will be likely to justify the authorities abstaining from taking a return decision.

It does not, however, imply that the administration has the obligation to put the interested person in a position to present his observations in a manner specific to the decision obliging him to leave French territory or on the decision of placing him in detention pending the execution of the expulsion measure as long as he has been heard on the illegality of his residence or the prospect of expulsion