Case summaries

The lower court had erred in law by judging that the administration need not justify having informed the applicant about the possibility to communicate with a  representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

In order for a correct application of the responsibility determination procedure under Dublin III to take place the applicant must be able to contest a transfer decision and invoke an infringement of the rule set out in subparagraph 19(2) DR III, i.e. where the applicant provides evidence that he/she has left the territory of one Member State, having made an application there, for at least three months and has made a new asylum application in another Member State.

Dublin III is characterised by the introduction or re-fortification of rights and mechanisms which guarantee the involvement of the asylum seeker in the determination process. Article 27(1) when read in conjunction with Recital 19 is ,therefore, to be interpreted as allowing an asylum seeker to appeal a transfer decision on grounds that the Chapter III allocation criteria were incorrectly applied.

The application was in three parts: the applicants asked the tribunal to annul the police commissioner’s decision on how the registration of asylum requests was carried out in Paris; to compel the police commissioner to re-examine the methods of registration; to fine the state €1500. The first two parts of the application were granted but the third was not. 

In the case of a claimant whose first asylum application would be viewed as being withdrawn by Bulgarian authorities, it cannot be ruled out that upon return to Bulgaria under a take back request the applicant would not be detained. In light of reported detention conditions the Secretary of State should have investigated the risk of a potential Article 3 violation if the applicant were to be returned to Bulgaria.  

The court overturned a decision to transfer the Applicant to his first country of asylum, Bulgaria, and also overturned the placement of the Applicant in administrative detention for five days.

The court held that given the general state of reception conditions for asylum applicants in Bulgaria and the Applicant’s particular circumstances, in particular his physical vulnerability, there were substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for asylum applicants and that if the Applicant was handed over to Bulgarian authorities, his asylum application would not be properly examined or he would be at risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and paragraph 2 of article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”).

The Court of Appeal concluded that the referral of an appeal under the Dublin III Regulation to an administrative agency breaches an applicant’s right to efficient remedy. 

An asylum applicant can be sent to a Safe Third Country by a Member State who has admitted responsibility under Dublin III in the context of a take back request, where the applicant has left the responsible Member State before a decision on the first asylum application has been taken on its merits.

The absence of information being provided to the sending Member State by the receiving Member State on the latter’s legislation and practice regarding STC does not prevent an asylum applicant being sent to a STC or breach  an applicant’s right to an effective remedy

Where an applicant has been taken back by a responsible Member State there is no obligation on the State to re-open the examination of the application at the exact point where it was left.

In case of conflict between a domestic and international norm the Court is obliged to adhere to the latter and set aside the former. Given the well-established right to an effective remedy in international and European instruments, an element of which relates to the remedy’s timeliness, the court is obliged to remake the OIN’s subsidiary protection decision and provide the applicant with refugee status. This conclusion applies notwithstanding that domestic legislation prohibits the Court from reforming an OIN decision. To abide by this legislation would result in a never-ending appeal procedure thereby rendering the remedy ineffective.

The Council of State requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the compatibility of Belgian Law with Article 5 of Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Directive”). The Directive requires Member States to respect the principle of non-refoulement, as well as ensure that there is a right to an effective remedy.

Under Belgian Law, the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (the “Commissioner”) can dismiss an asylum application and issue an order to leave the territory (“Return Order”), before any judicial appeals or other asylum procedures have been exhausted.

The question in the current case was whether the relevant Belgian legislative provisions were contrary to the Directive. The proceedings were suspended pending a preliminary ruling by the CJEU (C-77/17 and C-78/17).