Case summaries

The Supreme Court of Ireland handed down a judgment concerning the question whether the Minister for Justice and Equality is obliged to revoke a deportation order or otherwise facilitate a person to enter the State, when that person has been granted consent to make a subsequent application for international protection under section 22 of the International Protection Act 2015, which requires the person's presence in the State to make the application. It was held that there is no express right to enter the State for the purposes of making an application, save where the person is at its frontiers.

The CJEU found that the judge assigned to rule upon the applicant’s detention should have transmitted his request for international protection to the competent authority so it could be registered, and the applicant could enjoy his rights provided by Directive 2013/33. It also found that he should not have been detained since he was protected by his applicant for international protection’s status under Directives 2013/33 and 2013/32.

Not all cases with an international element can establish jurisdiction under the Convention; an assessment of exceptional circumstances on the basis of the specific facts of each case is required.

The applicants do not have any connecting links with Belgium and their sole presence in the premises of the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon cannot establish jurisdiction, as they were never under the de facto control of Belgian diplomatic or consular agents. Jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR cannot be established solely on the basis of an administrative procedure initiated by private individuals outside the territory of the chosen state, without them having any connection with that State, nor any treaty obligation compelling them to choose that state.

The Court found no violation of the Convention given that the applicants would have had access to a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion had  they entered lawfully into Spain – they did not have any “cogent reasons” for not using the border procedures available at designated entry points. As such, the lack of an individualised procedure for their removal was the consequence of their own conduct.

When State Parties do not examine an application for international protection in its mertis based on a safe third country clause, Article 3 still requires that they apply a thorough and comprehensive legal procedure to assess the existence of such risk by looking into updated sources regarding the situation in the receiving third country. Hungary violated Article 3 by failing to conduct an efficient and adequate assessment when applying the safe third country clause for Serbia.

Article 5 cannot be considered as ratione materiae applicable to the Röszke transit zone; the applicants' stay there involved a short waiting time in order for Hungary to verify their right to enter, they had entered on their own initiative and they were free to leave the area in the direction of Serbia. The conditions in the transit zone were not found to breach Article 3 because of the restrictive measure's short duration, the possibility for human contact and the applicants' awareness of the procedure.

The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of the State Attorney. He appealed the National Court’s judgement that accepted to consider an application for the re-examination of international protection that was denied in first instance, and was presented in a different place. The Supreme Court concludes that even if an application is not presented before the competent authority, are these authorities the ones who have to refer the case to the competent. Since this referral was not done, the petition for re-examination is valid.

The Court of Appeal set aside the Upper Tribunal’s Country Guidance on internal relocation to Kabul, on the basis that it had made a factual error, wrongly stating that civilian causalities amounted to less than 0.001 per cent, rather than less than 0.1 per cent, of the population of Kabul. However, it did dismiss AS’s ground of appeal, which concerned whether internal relocation would be unreasonable.

There is a case of urgent necessity concerning interim measures according to § 123 VwGO obliging a Member State to accept a take charge request regarding  the asylum applications of family members of a person entitled to subsidiary protection in that state when the decision on an asylum application of these family members is imminent in the requesting state. 

The High Court granted an order under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that the scheme of “Right to Rent” set out in sections 20-37 of the Immigration Act 2014 was incompatible with ECHR rights, along with a further order that it could not be extended beyond England without a further evaluation. 

The difficulties in access to the regional telephone operating centers set up by the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII) in order to obtain an appointment to register asylum applications leads to legal uncertainty for asylum seekers. This legal uncertainty violates their constitutional right to asylum, and therefore creates an emergency situation on which the Urgent Applications Judge can adjudicate.