Case summaries

The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) quashed a decision of the Finnish Immigration Service which, applying the Dublin II Regulation, did not examine the application for international protection and decided to return the applicant to Greece. The SAC returned the case to the Immigration Service for a new examination based on new evidence that was presented regarding the applicant’s health.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4.3 of the Qualification Directive and the nature of the assessment of the facts and circumstances of a refugee application that should take place. The Court rejected the argument that a failure by a first instance decision-maker to consider each of the mandatory matters set out in Article 4.3 rendered that decision unlawful such that it must be quashed, rather than allowing for any such defect to be cured by an appeal body. The obligation imposed by the Directive is satisfied when any errors or misjudgements at the first instance stage, including deficiencies in complying with Article 4.3 are remedied by an appeal stage.

The applicant complained that the refusal to recommend refugee status at first instance contained errors such that on appeal the “core claim” was effectively being heard for the first time, and further the subsidiary protection assessment was not in compliance with statutory requirements which gave effect to the Qualification Directive; and that he should have had a chance to comment on country of origin information used in the assessment of his application.

The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) found the applicant not credible and therefore did not assess the risk of serious harm. Instead the OIN granted protection against refoulement. The Metropolitan Court ruled that the OIN was obliged to assess conditions for subsidiary protection and serious harm even if the applicant was not found credible.

This case concerned subsequent applications and previous findings. The CALL ruled that, when deciding on a subsequent application, it is not competent to re-judge issues that have been decided in earlier applications. The CALL confirmed that those issues are final, unless evidence is submitted that is of such a nature that it demonstrates in a certain manner that those earlier decisions would have been different had that evidence been submitted at that time. 

The applicant claimed asylum on the grounds of having suffered female genital mutilation (FGM) and being subject to a forced marriage. The Ministry of Interior refused the application and the applicant lodged an appeal before the High National Court who also rejected the appeal (the applicant was granted a residence permit for humanitarian reasons). The applicant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

This case concerned the insufficient sourcing of evidence relied upon by the decision maker in dismissing the applicant’s claim for protection. It was found to be a violation of Art 16.1 of the Asylum Procedures Directive where the decision was insufficiently sourced in the applicant’s file. Further that this violation is not remedied by making specific references to those sources before the court. 

The Court examined the issue of when the refusal of the applicant’s State of nationality to provide documents to allow her to be readmitted to that State represents a denial of the applicant’s nationality and, consequently, provides a basis for a claim for asylum. The Court held that the deprivation of nationality can constitute persecution. It further held that concepts of de jure and de facto nationality, applied by the Tribunal in the appeal, were likely to obscure the question of whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution. It held that the correct standard of proof in respect of the issue of re-documentation will usually be the balance of probabilities rather than a reasonable degree of likelihood. It further held that, to prove her case, the applicant was under a duty to take all reasonable steps in good faith to obtain documents from the authorities of her State of nationality.

This case concerned the assessment of religious persecution. The court found that:

1. Even under the Qualification Directive not every restriction of religious freedom results in persecution within the meaning of asylum law. Whether a measure is tied to religion as a reason for persecution is found within Art 10 of the Qualification Directive; but what right is protected, and to what extent, proceeds from Art 9 of the Qualification Directive.
2. Interference in a core area of religious freedom represents a severe violation of a basic human right within the meaning of Art 9.1 of the Qualification Directive. Whether, and under what conditions, religious activity in public is also included, is a matter of uncertainty under Community law that must ultimately be clarified by the European Court of Justice.