Case summaries

This case concerned the insufficient sourcing of evidence relied upon by the decision maker in dismissing the applicant’s claim for protection. It was found to be a violation of Art 16.1 of the Asylum Procedures Directive where the decision was insufficiently sourced in the applicant’s file. Further that this violation is not remedied by making specific references to those sources before the court. 

The Court examined the issue of when the refusal of the applicant’s State of nationality to provide documents to allow her to be readmitted to that State represents a denial of the applicant’s nationality and, consequently, provides a basis for a claim for asylum. The Court held that the deprivation of nationality can constitute persecution. It further held that concepts of de jure and de facto nationality, applied by the Tribunal in the appeal, were likely to obscure the question of whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution. It held that the correct standard of proof in respect of the issue of re-documentation will usually be the balance of probabilities rather than a reasonable degree of likelihood. It further held that, to prove her case, the applicant was under a duty to take all reasonable steps in good faith to obtain documents from the authorities of her State of nationality.

This case concerned the assessment of religious persecution. The court found that:

1. Even under the Qualification Directive not every restriction of religious freedom results in persecution within the meaning of asylum law. Whether a measure is tied to religion as a reason for persecution is found within Art 10 of the Qualification Directive; but what right is protected, and to what extent, proceeds from Art 9 of the Qualification Directive.
2. Interference in a core area of religious freedom represents a severe violation of a basic human right within the meaning of Art 9.1 of the Qualification Directive. Whether, and under what conditions, religious activity in public is also included, is a matter of uncertainty under Community law that must ultimately be clarified by the European Court of Justice.

1. The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
2. In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
3. A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
4. The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.

A permit to stay, granted on humanitarian grounds to a foreigner whose application for asylum has been rejected until such time as it becomes feasible for him to go abroad, is of a temporary nature. It is possible to extend the validity of such a permit if there are exceptional circumstances relating to the prevailing situation in the foreigner's country of origin and/or relating to his personal circumstances. When an application to extend a permit to stay is submitted, the Administration should examine any exceptional grounds that may have been put forward.

Unlike with subsidiary protection, it is necessary for there to be a causal link between persecution and the grounds for persecution when assessing the conditions for granting asylum. The fact that a conflict between LTTE and governmental armed units affected Tamil civilians does not mean nationality qualifies as a ground of persecution. 

This concerned whether the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) were required to make an assessment of subsidiary protection, and whether ORAC were obliged to examine country of origin information in every case. The court found that ORAC were not required to make a subsidiary protection assessment. The Court held that ORAC were not obliged to examine country of origin information in every case.

State protection should be assessed in the applicant’s home area, in the absence of an internal relocation alternative.  The Tribunal erred in finding that the fact that the applicant had been raped at her home on 3 separate occasions over a short period by government soldiers had the same effect on assessing future risk as if she had been raped by civilians. The soldiers appeared to act with impunity whereas that would not necessarily be the case for civilians. In assessing future risk past experience was central, as reflected in Art 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and by common sense. 

A Lebanese woman was recognised as a refugee after a death threat by her brother because of her way of life. The court found:

1. State protection doesn’t exist against ‘honour killings’ in Lebanon.
2. Women who do not accept discrimination and denial of rights, which are based on tradition and social circumstances in their home country, constitute a particular social group in terms of Art. 10 (2) (d) of the Qualification Directive.
3. Even a single person can be a non-state actor under Section 60 (1) sentence (4) (c) of the Residence Act (identical to Art 6 (c) of the Qualification Directive).