Case summaries
The Applicants applied for asylum in Sweden, stating that they had arrived from Syria. However, investigations showed that the Applicants had entered Hungary via Serbia and applied for asylum in Hungary prior to arriving to Sweden. The Migration Court of Appeal found that the Hungarian asylum procedure and reception conditions did not contain such substantial deficiencies, that it was impossible to transfer the Applicants to Hungary in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation. However, two of the Applicants were small children, and had the Applicants been transferred to Hungary there was an imminent risk of lengthy waiting periods and a long period in custody before the Applicants could have their applications examined, which would have a considerable negative effect on the children’s health and development. Therefore, according to the Migration Court of Appeal a transfer of the Applicants under the circumstances was not consistent with the principle of the best interests of the children. With rejection of the Migration Agency’s complaint, the Applicants’ asylum applications were to be examined in Sweden.
If an Applicant, whilst his asylum application is being processed, is held in a limited area, this may be in contravention of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). In determining this, the Court may take into account all of the circumstances of the case, in particular the nature, period and effect of the holding of the Applicant and how the holding of the Applicant is enforced.
The application for international protection by a Syrian national was declared inadmissible based on the finding that Egypt was a Safe Third Country for the applicant. The Court of the Hague concludes that the State Secretary has failed to substantiate his claim that Egypt could be considered a Safe Third Country.
In order for a correct application of the responsibility determination procedure under Dublin III to take place the applicant must be able to contest a transfer decision and invoke an infringement of the rule set out in subparagraph 19(2) DR III, i.e. where the applicant provides evidence that he/she has left the territory of one Member State, having made an application there, for at least three months and has made a new asylum application in another Member State.
The decision of the Administrative Court Düsseldorf of January 8, 2016 - 23 L 3974 / 15.A, which ordered the removal of the complainant to Bulgaria, breaches his fundamental right under Article 3, paragraph 1 of Basic Law in its manifestation as a general prohibition on arbitrariness. The Administrative Court should have more closely scrutinised the newly available information on the situation pertaining to asylum seekers and persons with international protection status in Bulgaria. The decision of the Administrative Court Düsseldorf is repealed and the case is referred back to the Administrative Court Düsseldorf.
The Federal Administrative Court (the “Court”) suspended its decision and referred the case to the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) pursuant to Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) to obtain a preliminary ruling with regards to the following question:
Do the provisions of Regulation No. 604/2013 (“Dublin-III-Regulation”)
i) the obligation of a Member State to (re-)file a request to take back the applicant with another Member State; and
ii) the possible transfer of the responsibility for examining an application,
apply in relation to an applicant who has been deported to the Member State where he had first entered the EU and illegally re-enters the Member State that had filed the request to take back and deported the applicant.
The 6-month period under Art. 29 (1) Dublin-III -Regulation begins after the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the person concerned has been accepted or the fiction of such acceptance (Art. 29(1) first alternative) or of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3) (Art. 29(1) second alternative). In the second case, the later event determines when the time limit begins to run, unless the time limit for the transfer triggered by the acceptance of the request to take back or to take charge has already expired. In such a case, the latter event is decisive to determine when the period begins, unless the 6-month period triggered by the (deemed) acceptance had already expired.
The decision of denying asylum is disproportionate, as the fact that the acts of persecution are indiscriminate and affect a large majority of the population do not exclude the application of the 1951 Convention when the necessary elements of the provision are present. The reports of UNHCR were also noted in the Court’s assessment, particularly regarding the risk groups that the organisation has characterised.
Article 33 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with the Geneva Convention, requires Member States to allow persons to whom they have granted subsidiary protection status not only to move freely within their territory but also to choose their place of residence within that territory. However, the Directive does not prevent beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status from being subject to a residence condition for the purpose of promoting their integration where said group of persons are not in a comparable situation as non-EU citizens.
It is an appeal against the decision handed down by the Administrative Court of Lisboa that granted asylum to a Syrian citizen.
The recursive claim was declared unfounded by the Central Court, inter alia because the applicant’s mere transit from Brazil could not be considered as a connecting link that could render Brazil a safe third country.