Case summaries
The application for international protection by a Syrian national was declared inadmissible based on the finding that Egypt was a Safe Third Country for the applicant. The Court of the Hague concludes that the State Secretary has failed to substantiate his claim that Egypt could be considered a Safe Third Country.
In order for a correct application of the responsibility determination procedure under Dublin III to take place the applicant must be able to contest a transfer decision and invoke an infringement of the rule set out in subparagraph 19(2) DR III, i.e. where the applicant provides evidence that he/she has left the territory of one Member State, having made an application there, for at least three months and has made a new asylum application in another Member State.
The decision of the Administrative Court Düsseldorf of January 8, 2016 - 23 L 3974 / 15.A, which ordered the removal of the complainant to Bulgaria, breaches his fundamental right under Article 3, paragraph 1 of Basic Law in its manifestation as a general prohibition on arbitrariness. The Administrative Court should have more closely scrutinised the newly available information on the situation pertaining to asylum seekers and persons with international protection status in Bulgaria. The decision of the Administrative Court Düsseldorf is repealed and the case is referred back to the Administrative Court Düsseldorf.
The Federal Administrative Court (the “Court”) suspended its decision and referred the case to the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) pursuant to Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) to obtain a preliminary ruling with regards to the following question:
Do the provisions of Regulation No. 604/2013 (“Dublin-III-Regulation”)
i) the obligation of a Member State to (re-)file a request to take back the applicant with another Member State; and
ii) the possible transfer of the responsibility for examining an application,
apply in relation to an applicant who has been deported to the Member State where he had first entered the EU and illegally re-enters the Member State that had filed the request to take back and deported the applicant.
The 6-month period under Art. 29 (1) Dublin-III -Regulation begins after the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the person concerned has been accepted or the fiction of such acceptance (Art. 29(1) first alternative) or of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3) (Art. 29(1) second alternative). In the second case, the later event determines when the time limit begins to run, unless the time limit for the transfer triggered by the acceptance of the request to take back or to take charge has already expired. In such a case, the latter event is decisive to determine when the period begins, unless the 6-month period triggered by the (deemed) acceptance had already expired.
The decision of denying asylum is disproportionate, as the fact that the acts of persecution are indiscriminate and affect a large majority of the population do not exclude the application of the 1951 Convention when the necessary elements of the provision are present. The reports of UNHCR were also noted in the Court’s assessment, particularly regarding the risk groups that the organisation has characterised.
Article 33 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with the Geneva Convention, requires Member States to allow persons to whom they have granted subsidiary protection status not only to move freely within their territory but also to choose their place of residence within that territory. However, the Directive does not prevent beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status from being subject to a residence condition for the purpose of promoting their integration where said group of persons are not in a comparable situation as non-EU citizens.
It is an appeal against the decision handed down by the Administrative Court of Lisboa that granted asylum to a Syrian citizen.
The recursive claim was declared unfounded by the Central Court, inter alia because the applicant’s mere transit from Brazil could not be considered as a connecting link that could render Brazil a safe third country.
The Upper Tribunal ordered the Secretary of State for the Home Department to immediately admit four vulnerable Syrians from an unofficial migrant camp in France to the United Kingdom in order to be reunited with refugee family members during the examination their asylum applications. Although they had not applied for asylum in France or been subject to Dublin procedures, the particular circumstances meant that failing to do so would lead to a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for family life.
When addressing asylum claims, refugee status must be recognised when there is a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons foreseen in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Assessment of an asylum request fundamentally needs careful consideration of the facts and personal circumstances of the asylum seeker, as well as an analysis of the nature of the risk. The criteria of this test does not have to be restrictive, it is sufficient that the competent authority has a rational belief that the requirements are met for the purpose of receiving refugee status.
This case is concerned with whether the decision to deny the asylum application and the subsequently imposed entry ban were justified based on articles 1F(a)-(c). Under these provisions the Secretary of State can raise national security as a ‘serious ground’ for his decision if an element of ‘personal participation’ can be proven.