Case summaries

In deciding extradition cases, the best interests of the child, although a primary consideration, could be outweighed by other interests, in this case effective immigration control. The impact of the family's extradition on the interests of the children was judged proportional, if weighed against the Zoumbas' appalling immigration record and the fact that the family could be removed without serious detriment to the children's well-being. Important guidelines were given for the decision of cases involving the welfare of children.

A stateless Palestinian woman from Syria who was registered with the UNRWA but who was no longer receiving support from the organisation was granted refugee status by the Migration Court of Appeal, and the case was returned to the Swedish Migration Board for re-examination of the period of validity of the residence permit.

This case concerns the State’s obligation under Article 19(3) of the Reception Direction to trace the family members of unaccompanied child asylum applicants.  The Court considers the effect on their claims where there is a failure by the State to carry out that duty.

According to section 51 of the Aliens Act, third-country nationals residing in Finland are issued with a temporary residence permit if they cannot be returned to their home country or country of permanent residence for temporary reasons of health or if they cannot be removed from the country.

This case concerned whether it was necessary that there was an enforceable decision to remove the person when the Immigration Service examined the requirements for a residence permit under section 51. The Court considered whether the Immigration Service should examine if there are in reality obstacles to the removal of a person, before it makes a decision to remove this person.

Interventions from third parties to proceedings initiated before the National Asylum Court may be admitted.

A person with refugee status in one European Union state who applies for refugee status in a second European Union state is presumed to have unfounded fears relating to lack of protection. However, that presumption may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 

The Applicant's claims that he would be in danger in Syria because of the civil war there were accepted, because he was a Christian and is considered an enemy by both sides and because he left his country illegally and applied for international protection. The Applicant's fear of being killed as a non-combatant in the civil war was considered to be well-founded. It was considered that there was a reasonable chance that he would be arrested and mistreated since the Syrian state would perceive him to have political beliefs since he had lived abroad and would be considered to be opposed to the regime. Internal relocation of the Applicant was not possible because if the Applicant were to return to any region of Syria he would be at risk of suffering serious harm because of the indiscriminate violence and also because the actor of persecution was national/governmental. The Applicant was recognised as a refugee.

A determination must disclose clearly the reasons for a tribunal's decision.  If a tribunal finds oral evidence to be implausible, incredible or unreliable or a document to be worth no weight whatsoever, it is necessary to say so in the determination and for such findings to be supported by reasons.  A bare statement that a witness was not believed or that a document was afforded no weight is unlikely to satisfy the requirement to give reasons.

It is impossible to advise the Applicant to request the protection of public bodies in a situation in which the public bodies obviously discriminate against a certain religious group. When examining the alternative option of internal relocation, it is necessary to assess the legal and factual availability in terms of the circumstances of the Applicant. It is impossible to build the protection proceedings on a testimony with partial inaccuracies and to revert to translated reports provided by the Applicant.

The Asylum Court violated the right of access to the courts by rejecting an appeal in a case where an application for family reunification had been submitted at an Embassy. The asylum authorities acted arbitrarily in assuming that there was no legal entitlement to a formal notification of the decision in writing on such an application.

The rules on safe third countries, according to which applications for international protection in the event of a threatened violation of Art 8 ECHR must not be refused on the basis of formal safety in another country, is to be applied similarly to the Dublin II Regulation. If the Applicant already has subsidiary protection in one Member State, in accordance with the Dublin II Regulation his application in a different State in which his son, who is a minor and entitled to asylum, is living, (in addition to the Applicant’s pregnant wife) must not be refused.  On the contrary, this State must make use of the right to assume responsibility for the examination.