Case summaries

An asylum seeker cannot be considered to have ‘absconded’ within the meaning of the Dublin II Regulation because they failed to respond to a request to come to a police station in order to regularise their situation as an asylum seeker.

This was a decision of the Polish Refugee Board of 31 January 2013 to uphold that part of the decision of the Head of the Polish Office for Foreigners which concerned refusal to accord refugee status and to overturn the remainder of the decision as well as to grant subsidiary protection.

In the course of criminal proceedings conducted against a foreigner in Poland it was revealed to Iranian consular officials that the foreigner concerned was being held at the Centre for Foreigners seeking refugee status in Dębak. This could have been tantamount to disclosing that the foreigner was applying for refugee status in Poland. Although it is not known whether the foreigner would have suffered repression from the authorities upon returning to Iran, such a possibility cannot be excluded. This circumstance does not fall within the concept of particular social group. However, considering the scale of human rights abuses in Iran and the unpredictability of the regime, there exists a real threat of torture or of inhuman or degrading treatment.

In order to determine whether an Applicant is exposed to a significant, specific risk stemming from an armed conflict, reference should be made to the actual target location of the foreign national upon return in the case of a localised armed conflict. This is often the region of origin of the Applicant. If the region of origin cannot be considered as the target location due to the risk facing the claimant, the latter may only be referred to another region in the country subject to the requirements of Article 8 of the Qualification Directive.

With regard to the evaluation as to whether extraordinary circumstances exist which do not come under the direct responsibility of the target deportation state and which prohibit the deporting state from deporting the foreign national according to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, reference should be made to the target deportation state as a whole in order to verify whether these circumstances exist in the location in which the deportation ends. 

In the case of individuals who are eligible for subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the limitation of residence represents an unauthorised limitation on the free movement of persons according to Article 32 of the Qualification Directive if it is based solely on social welfare grounds.  

Refugee status was recognised for a transgender woman from Pakistan because discrimination for reasons relevant to asylum as well as involuntary prostitution to earn a living are sufficiently serious to represent persecution within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

It is the duty of the administrative body to deal reasonably with objections to intrusion into the private and family life of the applicant within international protection proceedings.

Failure to integrate into the country, which is typically the case, does not constitute grounds for protection. Behaviour a long time previously in relation to the entry is not significant when assessing security requirements. Aggressive behaviour in the Federal Support Centre does not alone represent a need for security which justifies detention (deportation detention). Despite removal from the Federal Support Centre owing to this behaviour, this must not lead to an asylum seeker losing his entitlement to basic services.

This case concerned the appropriate interpretation to be given to the determination of the Court of Justice in Case C-277/2012, M.M. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in answer to the questions posed by the High Court of Ireland pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.

The Court of Justice answered in the negative the question posed that the duty to cooperate required the decision maker to supply the Applicant with a draft of any possible adverse decision for comment prior to its formal adoption.

However, the Court of Justice also considered the Irish system for protection decision making more broadly and concluded that it was unlawful not to allow for a further hearing of the Applicant in the course of examination of the subsidiary protection application – following the conclusion of a negative decision on an asylum claim.

The High Court held that the appropriate interpretation to be given to the judgment in this regard was that, in order for a hearing to be effective, it would at a minimum, involve a procedure whereby the Applicant was invited to comment on any adverse credibility findings made at the asylum stage; a completely fresh opportunity to revisit all matters bearing on the claim for subsidiary protection; and a completely fresh assessment of the Applicant's credibility in circumstances where the mere fact that the asylum decision maker had ruled adversely on this question would not in itself suffice or be directly relevant to this fresh credibility assessment.

The Court opined that the finding of the Court of Justice did not suggest that an oral hearing would be routinely required at subsidiary protection stage, but considered it unnecessary at that juncture to conclusively determine the issue.

It was unlawful to refuse to issue a travel document to the holder of subsidiary protection status on the assumption that the person had provided false information prior to the decision on the asylum application and because identity documentation in his file was incomplete.

A beneficiary of refugee status sought family reunification unsuccessfully for her niece and nephew who she referred to as her own children; who had been orphaned; and whom she was not capable of formally adopting owing to the absence of available procedures in Somalia or where they were living in Ethiopia. The children had attained the age of majority after the Application had been made, but prior to a decision. The Minister refused family reunification on the basis that they were not dependent.

The Applicant was successful in her Judicial Review as the Court found that the Minister had erred in restricting the assessment of dependency to the narrow issue of being financially dependent. Dependency should take into account all relevant social, economic, personal, physical, emotional and cultural bonds between the refugee and family member being considered. Furthermore the Minister did not conduct a proper investigation as to what would be objectively required to amount to dependency, and appeared to carry out “no more than an arbitrary evaluation based on no identified criteria”.