Case summaries

This case concerns whether the Tribunal correctly applied the test for internal flight and / or state protection.

This was a decision on an injunction application in the course of judicial review proceedings challenging a subsidiary protection decision and deportation order on the basis of a failure by the Minister to cooperate with the applicant in processing the subsidiary protection application and that the failure to provide a mechanism of appeal against a refusal of subsidiary protection  breaches the principal of equivalence in European Union law in that the procedure under the (Irish) 2006 Regulations is inferior to that provided for in national law (the Refugee Act 1996 as amended) in respect of decisions on claims for asylum.

The (injunction) application was rejected on the basis that it was only since the requirements of the Procedures Directive, and, in particular, the deeming provision of its Annex 1, became effective in Irish law (in 2007) that the recommendation of the Commissioner fell to be considered as the first instance determination by a “determining authority” with an appeal to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. Thus, insofar as the provisions of the 1996 Act can now be pointed to as providing a two-stage determination for an asylum application including a right to an effective remedy by way of appeal, it is only because of the manner in which the State has adapted the arrangements of the 1996 Act in order to comply with the requirements of the Procedures Directive for asylum (refugee) applications pursuant to Article 3.1. Furthermore, without a unified system for both applications the minimum procedural standards provide for in the Procedures Directive do not apply to a separate and discrete subsidiary protection application.

In relation to the ‘co-operation’ point the Court found that a claim of non-compliance with such a duty of “co-operation” or the principle audi alteram partem cannot be made as a purely academic point divorced from specific facts. The applicant in this case eschewed the need to identify any particular finding in the Subsidiary Protection determination which might have been corrected or altered had the applicant been consulted upon it.

Unlike the Procedures Directive, Article 4.1 of the Qualifications Directive refers to the duty of co-operation in respect of the “application for international protection,” that is, the claim to asylum and the claim to subsidiary protection. Article 14.2 of the Procedures Directive recognises, however, that the report of the personal interview with the applicant on which the decision of the determining authority on an asylum application is based, may be communicated to the asylum seeker after the decision has been adopted. The Court found that it would be inconsistent with these arrangements that the duty of cooperation in Article 4.1 should be construed as imposing on a determining authority a mandatory obligation to submit either the report or a draft decision in relation to a subsidiary protection application to an applicant for prior comment. Furthermore, the duty to co-operate provided for in Article 4.1only applies to those elements of the claim described in Article 4.2. These are, in effect, the basic facts and documents relating to the applicant’s personal history and to the basis of the claim and they are primarily considered and assessed in the asylum process including any appeal.

This was an appeal against a decision to expel a widowed illiterate mother and five of her children who had been granted subsidiary protection in Bulgaria. Austria did not have to apply the sovereignty clause, as the situation in Bulgaria did not give rise to a real risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR. Although the applicant’s sixth child had entered Austria and applied for asylum as an unaccompanied minor two years earlier, there was no violation of Art 8 ECHR because family reunification was possible in Bulgaria and there is no family life worth protecting.

This case concerned the meaning of the term “serious harm” in the Qualification Directive (as transposed into Irish law). The Irish state refused to grant the applicant subsidiary protection on the basis that the term imputes the absence of State protection, if the fear of harm is from non-state actors. The applicant argued that this was incorrect.

The asylum applicant who, in the case of a supervised departure, does not appear at the boarding of his/her flight where his/her pre-transportation to the airport was not ensured, cannot be considered as having absconded.

The Procedures Directive does not apply to subsidiary protection decisions when a Member State, such as Ireland, does not have a unified asylum procedure.

Refugee status was granted to a Kosovar family of Roma origin based on their ethnicity being recognised as a particular social group. The court found that they faced a risk of persecution and that state protection was either unavailable or ineffective.

The case involved the rejection of an asylum application by an Iranian citizen of Kurdish origins who cited a fear of persecution because of his religious opinions and, specifically, having become a Christian. In support of his claims he submitted his baptism certificate and invoked the punishment stipulated by the legal system in his country of origin for changing his religion. The Minister for Public Order's decision on the party's application was annulled for being insufficiently reasoned.

Right to remain arises the moment an alien indicates he would like to be granted asylum. This means that an alien, from that time onwards, cannot be refused access to the territory; he may be refused only 'further access', in other words 'actual further entry' to the territory.

Domestic Immmigration Rules are likely to bar family reunion for children of refugees who have been informally adopted or whose legal adoption is not recognised by the UK.