Case summaries

Section 62 subsection 3 first sentence No. 5 of the German Act of the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory (Residence Act) does not comply with the requirements in Art. 2(n) Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013 which defines ‘risk of absconding’ as the existence of reasons in an individual case, which are based on objective criteria defined by law. Section 62 subsection 3 first sentence No. 5 of the Residence Act names ‘risk of absconding’ as a reason for detention but lacks the required objective criteria to determine the existence of the ‘risk of absconding’. Therefore according to the current legal situation in Germany detention in order to ensure the transfer as per Art. 28 Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013 cannot be based on the detention reason ‘risk of absconding’.

The detention reasons named in Section 62 subsection 3 first sentence No. 2 and No. 3 of the Residence Act comply with the requirements in Art. 2(n) Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013. Detention in order to ensure the transfer as per Art. 28 Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013 can be based on these provisions.

The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State denying the Claimants a right of in-country appeal against the removal of the Claimants to Italy under the Dublin Regulation. The Claimants argued that their removal to Italy would expose them to a real risk of a breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The court found that there was no evidence to rebut the presumption that Italy would comply with its obligations under EU laws or of special vulnerability in the personal circumstances of any of the Claimants, to support the assertion that Article 3 of the ECHR would be breached by the Claimants’ removal to Italy. 

In the case of the Nigerian asylum-seeker, the Court found the objection of the OIN unfounded, repealed its decision and ordered the OIN to conduct a new procedure.

The Court emphasised that the contradictions which were encountered by the OIN were irrelevant regarding the applicant’s flight testimony, therefore the applicant can be considered credible.

After an initial refusal, for the re-examination of an asylum application to be admissible:

either, new facts must have arisen since the first decision; or, facts existed prior to the first decision but were rightfully unknown to the Applicant at the time of the first decision, and;

the aforementioned facts are capable of establishing grounds for a re-examination of the case.

The provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive have been fully transposed into the CESEDA. A decision of the OFPRA based on all the documents/ evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his subsequent application without an interview does not infringe Article 41(2) of the Charter. When OFPRA considered the subsequent application, it was legitimate for it to have rejected the application without any interview since the new documents/ evidence provided were without merits. The Court found that M.A’s application must be rejected without any need to re-examine the facts he submitted, including those in his first application. The application of M.A was rejected.

By not considering country information submitted by the applicant, the Slovenian Migration Office did not establish all relevant facts and circumstances of the case before it. The Office had not clearly and precisely explained which reasons it considered as decisive in determining that the degree of indiscriminate violence in the applicant’s country of origin did not reach such a level that the applicant would be subjected to a serious and individual threat to his life or person in the event of return to his country of origin.

In the case of an individual benefiting from subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the non-fulfilment of the passport obligation cannot be taken into account in the exercising of discretion for the assessment of authorisation for access to employment.

The Supreme Court held that a person who is resisting a Dublin  transfer to the Member State responsible for processing the applicant's asylum claim need not show that there is a “systemic deficiency” in that Member State’s asylum system, rather that the conditions in that Member State would expose the person to inhumane and degrading treatment as prohibited by Article 3 ECHR. 

This case concerns whether it had been legal to apply exclusion clauses and refuse international protection for an applicant who was suspected of committing a serious crime. The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that subsidiary protection could be refused for a person who was suspected of committing aggravated rape.

A national decision maker must pay close attention to a United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) decision when determining an application for asylum. Such a decision does not create a presumption, however, substantive countervailing reasons are required to justify the decision maker coming to a different decision to the UNHCR.