Case summaries
The fact that riots took place in poorer neighbourhoods which resulted in sudden police charges to dispel the riots is insufficient for the application of Art 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.
The applicant was eligible for subsidiary protection as an internal armed conflict is taking place in Logar. The applicant, in case of return to Afghanistan, could not relocate to Kabul, since he could not secure his livelihood there. In order to secure his livelihood, he could not rely on property which his family had possessed in the province of Logar.
The administrative authorities, when carrying out an assessment of whether a subsequent application for refugee status is inadmissible (based on the same grounds), should compare the factual basis for the administrative case on which a final decision has been made with the testimony of the foreignor provided in the subsequent application and should also examine whether the situation in the country of origin of the applicant and also the legal position have changed.
The applicant claimed asylum in November 2009 alleging a well founded fear of persecution for reasons of race and religion. The application was refused by the Ministry of Interior on the grounds that the application did not amount to persecution in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention. On appeal, the High National Court re-examined the application and held that the conflict which had arisen in the Ivory Coast had to be taken into account and on that basis subsidiary protection should be granted.
A stateless Kurd from Syria was not recognised as a refugee. The court held:
- The denial of re-entry of stateless Kurds is not to be considered political persecution because a general institutional practice cannot be detected which is aimed against ethnic Kurds in a manner that is relevant to asylum grounds (Art 10 of the Qualification Directive).
- Whether the legal practice of Syrian legislation on citizenship and the denial of re-entry are part of a restrictive policy towards Kurds, and support the aims of the State of Syria in respect of its settlement policy, is not important when determining political persecution under Section 60 (1) sentence (5) of the Residence Act in connection with Art. 9 and 10 Qualification Directive.
The applicant could not substantiate the individual elements of his claim with respect to his well-founded fear of a blood feud; however, he was able to satisfy the criteria for subsidiary protection. As a result of the armed conflict that was ongoing in the respective province in his country of origin (Ghazni, Afghanistan), the high intensity of the indiscriminate violence was deemed to be sufficient to be a threatening factor to the applicant’s life. As a result, the criteria of subsidiary protection were fulfilled.
The question of whether the current situation in Iraq is an internal armed conflict (nationwide or regionally) according to Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act/Art. 15 (c) Qualification Directive was left open. Even if one assumes that such a conflict takes place, subsidiary protection is only to be granted if the applicant is exposed to a serious and individual threat to life or physical integrity “in the course of” such a conflict. This cannot be established regarding the applicant in the present case.
The situation which prevails today in some geographical areas of Somalia, in particular in and around Mogadishu, must be seen as a situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict, in the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].
The High Court refused leave to apply for judicial review of a deportation order on the grounds that the decision of the Minister for Justice was reasonable.
The case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to refuse a claim for subsidiary protection status on the grounds that the applicant was excluded as a result of his activities, which were considered ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ The appeal was successful, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted restrictively, that there must be ‘serious grounds to believe’ such acts were carried out and notwithstanding the exclusion clause, non refoulement obligations under Art 3 of the ECHR apply.