Case summaries
The Migration Court of Appeal returned the case to the Migration Court for investigation of whether there is an internal protection alternative for the man from Afghanistan. The Court found that an internal protection alternative must always be investigated as part of the protection assessment.
The CALL refers to the judgment in the case M. M. vs Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland, Attorney General by the Court of Justice of the European Union in relation to the interpretation of Article 4 of Directive 2004/83/EC to point out the obligation of Member States to cooperate in establishing the relevant elements in the asylum-seeker's story and thus to carry out a further examination of the specific situation of the asylum seeker.
The Applicants are not members of a particular social group as defined by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as neither their statements, nor the generally available information would indicate that Serbia considers their citizens originating from Kosovo as a particular group with specific characteristics.
Relying upon the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in relation to ECHR, Article 3 and the decision of the Constitutional Court Up-96/09, as referred to by the court of first instance, the Supreme Court ruled that minimal social and economic protection for an individual who is dependent on state aid does not represent a violation of dignity and therefore does not provide sufficient grounds for subsidiary protection. Poor socio-economic conditions, in which the majority of inhabitants of an individual country have found themselves, do not represent sufficient grounds for subsidiary protection.
An Iraqi man, previously a member of the Ba'ath Party, was granted refugee status. There were not found to be any grounds for exclusion. The man's son was also granted refugee status, with reference to the principle of family unity.
The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.
The appellant is a Syrian national of Kurdish ethnicity and claims to be affiliated to the Kurdish political party “Azadi Akrad Siria” and to carry out political propaganda activities on their behalf.The Court affirms the denial of asylum and furthermore excludes the appellant from having the status of refugee sur place, even though the situation in Syria has changed since the application for asylum was lodged.However, taking into account the severe deterioration of the socio-political situation in Syria, the Supreme Court recognises the appellant’s right to remain in Spain on humanitarian grounds.
Three Somali girls were considered to have a well-founded fear of being forced to undergo female genital mutilation and therefore gender-based persecution, which entitled them to be granted refugee status.
The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.
“If an asylum applicant is shown to be in need, and if it can be expected that an applicant’s fundamental human rights and freedoms would or might be infringed, the administrative authority must give the applicant for asylum or subsidiary protection the benefit of the doubt in relation to the facts stated by the applicant.”
The Court granted permission to the Applicant to seek judicial review of the negative decision made in a written appeal (rather than an oral appeal) in an application for refugee status made by a South African national. The decision to allow a written appeal was based on the status of South Africa as a ‘safe country,’ but because the appeal decision was based on personal credibility, the absence of an oral hearing may have been unlawful by reference to the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by the Asylum Procedures Directive.
This case concerned a real well-founded fear of persecution (re-enslavement of the Applicant), failure to recognise the Applicant's refugee status as a member “of a particular social group” and a finding that his fear was not due to the grounds for persecution as defined by Article 1A of the Convention.
It was held that, should he return to his country, there was a risk that the Applicant would suffer serious harm (inhuman and degrading treatment because of potential re-enslavement) which justified granting him subsidiary protection under Article 15(2)(b) of the Directive.
Furthermore, and irrespective of the above, the Committee felt that it would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under the said Article if the Applicant (who was suffering from chronic renal failure and hypertension) were deprived of the appropriate medical care and treatment for his condition, believing that should he return he would possibly not have access to the health care system (which was, in any case, deemed ineffective) in his country of origin, and this would be tantamount to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.