Case summaries
Article 33 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with the Geneva Convention, requires Member States to allow persons to whom they have granted subsidiary protection status not only to move freely within their territory but also to choose their place of residence within that territory. However, the Directive does not prevent beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status from being subject to a residence condition for the purpose of promoting their integration where said group of persons are not in a comparable situation as non-EU citizens.
The Court ruled that when deciding whether the subsequent application is admissible, new facts regarding the individual situation of the applicant or her situation in the country of origin as well as change in the situation of the country of origin alone are significant. When examining whether the grounds of the first and the subsequent application are the same, the essence of the facts is important, not the manner in which they are presented.
With regard to the applicant’s argument that in the present case the legal grounds for granting subsidiary protection were not examined, the Court stated that in the decision on discontinuing the procedure because of inadmissibility of the application, the authorities do not rule on refusal of refugee status, therefore there is no self-standing legal basis to examine the grounds for granting subsidiary protection. The present application, as the inadmissible one, could not have led to the in-merit examination of the grounds for granting refugee status and therefore could not have included the examination of the subsidiary protection grounds.
In the case of individuals who are eligible for subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the limitation of residence represents an unauthorised limitation on the free movement of persons according to Article 32 of the Qualification Directive if it is based solely on social welfare grounds.
1. The expulsion of a recognised refugee may only take place subject to the requirements of Article 21 (3) in conjunction with (2) and Article 24 (1) of the Qualification Directive.
2. Compelling grounds for public security or order according to Article 24 (1) of the Qualification Directive do not presuppose any outstanding acts of extraordinary danger in support of international terrorism; neither does specific involvement of a sympathiser suffice unless it is characterised by a large degree of continuity and as such shapes and influences the environment of the terrorist organisation.
This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application.
The case concerns an appeal lodged before the High Regional Court through the special procedure for Fundamental Rights (with the intervention of the Public Prosecutor). The applicant claimed asylum in Ceuta, Spain, and the application was accepted under the preliminary examination procedure. The applicant decided to move to the Spanish peninsula but he was prevented from crossing the border. He alleged that his right to free movement had been violated.