Case summaries
CD v Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky establishes that the right to remain under the Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32) completely immunises an applicant from being classified as an illegally staying third-country national under the Return Directive (2008/115). Consequently, a return decision cannot be issued at any point between the submission of an asylum application and the first-instance rejection of that application, even if the return decision concerns a period of illegal stay that occurred before the asylum application was made.
The Court of Justice held that defending personal interests against illegally acting non-state actors due to state corruption can be regarded as ‘political opinion’ under Directive 2011/95 if perceived as opposition by the persecuting actors.
The Federal Administrative Court found that Art. 3 of the Qualification Directive does not hinder Member States to allow parents and siblings, fulfilling the requirements for family members under Art. 2(j) of the Directive, to change their status of subsidiary protection into a refugee status which they derive from their minor sponsor.
The Court of Justice held that Directive 2011/95 does not preclude a Member State from granting refugee status to a minor through one of his parents, even though there is no risk of persecution in case of removal to his country of nationality (Tunisia).
The Court decides that the relevant point in time to assess the ‘minor’ status of a beneficiary of international protection under the Qualification Directive is the date on which the applicant makes an (informal) application for international protection.
The Court decides that the notion of ‘family member’ under the Qualification Directive does not require an actual resumption of family life between the parent who benefited international protection and the child. Furthermore, the rights of a family member to claim the benefits under the Qualification Directive persist after the beneficiary of subsidiary protection reaches the age of majority, for the duration of the period of validity of the residence permit granted to them.
The assessment of the existence of indiscriminate violence under Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive may not be based exclusively on a quantitative assessment of casualties and population ratios. A comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances of the individual case, and in particular those which characterise the situation of the applicant’s country of origin, is required.
When analysing if protection from UNRWA has ceased (Article 12(1)(a) Directive 2011/95), account must be taken of the possibility for the individual to concretely access effective protection in any of the other fields within UNRWA area of operations.
Assistance from the Agency must be considered as maintained when an individual has left UNRWA area of operations from a field where he couldn’t obtain effective protection, if the person had previously voluntarily left a field where he could access UNRWA’s assistance, even though he could reasonably foresee, according to the information available for him at the moment of departure, that he wouldn’t be able to receive effective protection from the Agency in the field he was travelling to, or return to the field of origin in the short term.
The Court found no violation of the Convention given that the applicants would have had access to a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion had they entered lawfully into Spain – they did not have any “cogent reasons” for not using the border procedures available at designated entry points. As such, the lack of an individualised procedure for their removal was the consequence of their own conduct.
Article 21(2) of the directive precludes Member States from issuing a measure of refoulement or expulsion against the persons covered by one of the scenarios described in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 if this would expose the concerned persons to the risk of their fundamental rights as enshrined in Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU.
The notification about the intention of withdrawal from the EU by the Member-State responsible for the examination of the application for international protection does not trigger the determining Member-State’s obligation to make use of the discretionary clause of Article 17(1) 604/2013 EU. Similarly, Article 6 (1) cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the Member State that is not responsible to take into account the best interests of the child and to examine the application itself under 17 (1)