Case summaries

This case is concerned with whether the decision to deny the asylum application and the subsequently imposed entry ban were justified based on articles 1F(a)-(c). Under these provisions the Secretary of State can raise national security as a ‘serious ground’ for his decision if an element of ‘personal participation’ can be proven.

The case appeals a decision of the Ministry of Interior to deny asylum and subsidiary protection considering the alleged crimes against humanity committed by the appellant, national of Iran. He was a member of a declared criminal organization. The Court analyses his adherence to the organisation following a proportionality approach. It addresses the need to examine the existence of substantial proof of the commission of crimes against humanity when applying the exclusion clauses to deny international protection. 

The issue in this case was “complicity” – the Court analysed the facts of the applicant’s involvement in a violent paramilitary force in Iran to determine whether he was complicit in crimes against humanity, so as to be excluded from international protection. 

Passive complicity in genocide includes a material element and an intentional element, as active complicity does.

The case concerned an appeal lodged before the High National Court against the decision of the Ministry of Interior to refuse to grant refugee status based on the application of two exclusion clauses, Art 1F(a) and 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The applicant challenged the application of the exclusion clauses arguing an individual assessment was required, as well as evidence of participation in the crimes mentioned. The appeal was rejected. 

Serious reasons have to be established in order to apply the exclusion clause in Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, i.e. the material and intentional elements specific to the complicity.

Membership of an organisation that was responsible for committing war crimes is not sufficient on its own to justify exclusion under Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention or Article 12(2)(a) of the Qualification Directive.  Membership of the LTTE or its ‘Intelligence Division” was not enough, on its own, to justify the applicant’s exclusion.

Responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity should be considered with regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and other international legal materials that have come into existence following the adoption of the Refugee Convention.

The decision maker should concentrate on the actual role played by the particular persons, taking all material aspects of that role into account so as to decide whether the required degree of participation is established. The Court identified a non-exhaustive list of some of the relevant factors that should be considered.

The CALL ruled that exclusion clauses are exceptional provisions with very serious consequences and should therefore be applied in a restrictive manner. There is a presumption of responsibility vis-à-vis persons holding high positions in a regime that is guilty of committing serious human rights violations, but such a presumption is refutable. It does not suffice to refer to the general situation in the country of origin at the time when the applicant held the position.

The House of Lords considered a number of issues arising out of the proposed deportation of three foreign nationals on the basis that each was a danger to the national security of the United Kingdom. The Court made three particularly relevant findings: (1) that Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention could be invoked to exclude an individual from the provisions of the Convention on the basis of acts committed after the applicant was recognised as a refugee; (2) Diplomatic assurances as to the treatment of an individual were relevant to assessing how an applicant would be treated upon return to their home State, though their assessment was a matter of fact, and; (3) relying on evidence obtained by torture in a criminal trial did not, as a matter of law, always amount to a flagrant denial of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR.