Case summaries

The Court of Justice held that defending personal interests against illegally acting non-state actors due to state corruption can be regarded as ‘political opinion’ under Directive 2011/95 if perceived as opposition by the persecuting actors.

The Court ruled that Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip can no longer count on the UNRWA’s protection or assistance. Therefore, the applicant does not fall within the scope of Article 1D of the Geneva Convention and must be recognized as a refugee. 

Except for very limited exceptions, the statutory three-year waiting period for family reunification of persons granted ‘temporary protection’ does not allow for an individualised assessment of the interest of family unity in light of the concrete situation of the persons concerned. Eventually the Court finds a violation of Article 8 of the Convention since the measure (whose goal is not otherwise challenged) had a disproportionate impact in the case at hand.

Well-grounded information is of central importance to any decision to exclude a person convicted for criminal matters from international protection in accordance with Article 1 F of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

This case is concerned with whether the decision to deny the asylum application and the subsequently imposed entry ban were justified based on articles 1F(a)-(c). Under these provisions the Secretary of State can raise national security as a ‘serious ground’ for his decision if an element of ‘personal participation’ can be proven.

Article 1F of the Refugee Convention relates to the application of a definition and not whether an individual seeking asylum should obtain protection or not. Therefore, and with regards to Article 1F(b), any post-offence conduct does not serve to mitigate the seriousness of an alleged non-political offence. No doctrine of expiation is to, thus, be applied to Article 1F(b).

The term serious used in Article 1F(b) denotes especially grave offending and requires no further qualification by the term “particularly." 

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order.

This case concerned special protection status in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention andexclusion from protection of those who have committed a serious crime under “common law”. The crime committed by the applicant (attempted murder of the Indian Ambassador in Romania) does not fall within the concepts of “political”, “composite” or “related” crimes, even if it was carried out because of the offender's political opinions or principles, or with the intent of achieving such aims. The implementation of the exclusion clause is not precluded because of the fact that the party has already served the sentence which was imposed. The judgment regarding the applicant having committed a serious criminal offence was justified. The decision was opposed by a minority. Consideration was given to the severity of the persecution the applicant risked suffering should he return to India and non-refoulement was approved, his deportation was given suspensive effect, and he was given temporary leave to remain on humanitarian grounds.

In considering the possible exclusion under Art 1F, careful consideration must be given to culpability. Domestic law including any defences must be accurately cited. When the applicant is a child, consideration of her age and understanding; together with consideration of her welfare must form part of the overall analysis. If a child is found to be excluded from asylum or humanitarian protection the welfare of the child should be considered when arrangements for other leave to remain are considered.

This case concerned the revocation of asylum and refugee status in the case of a former official of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (following the European Court of Justice case of Federal Republic of Germany v B (C-57/09) and D (C-101/09), 09 November 2010).

The case concerned an appeal lodged before the High National Court against the decision of the Ministry of Interior to refuse to grant refugee status based on the application of two exclusion clauses, Art 1F(a) and 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The applicant challenged the application of the exclusion clauses arguing an individual assessment was required, as well as evidence of participation in the crimes mentioned. The appeal was rejected.