Case summaries

The safe third country ground under Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 is optional; an application may be declared inadmissible on that basis even if the applicant qualifies for international protection, but it cannot be rejected as unfounded on that ground.

Article 38 requires national law to define criteria establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country to make transfer reasonable.

Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 permits reliance on publicly available sources and executive lists of safe third countries, provided that national law sets out a methodology for an individualised assessment of safety and allows the applicant to challenge the existence of the required connection.

Courts hearing appeals must verify the existence of such a connection, even if national law does not expressly grant that power.

In this case the Upper Tribunal provided that the Refugee Convention doesn’t offer protection from social conservatism and that there is no protected right to enjoy a socially liberal lifestyle. However, the Convention may be considered to apply where  ‘westernisation’ reflects a protected characteristic such as political opinion or religious belief, or if there is a real risk that the individual in question would be unable to mask his westernisation and persecutors would impute such protected characteristics to him. 

The assessment of the existence of indiscriminate violence under Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive may not be based exclusively on a quantitative assessment of casualties and population ratios. A comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances of the individual case, and in particular those which characterise the situation of the applicant’s country of origin, is required.

National legislation that grants the possibility of rejecting an application made by a third-country national or a stateless person for international protection, whose previous application seeking refugee status in another Member State implementing the Dublin III Regulation had been rejected, is precluded under Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32 read in conjunction with Article 2(q) thereof. 

An applicant that has received protection on behalf of UNRWA is not required to prove a fear of persecution to be recognised as a refugee; the asylum authorities have to examine whether the applicant was actually receiving UNRWA protection and whether that protection has ceased.

An individual examination of the case will reveal whether the cessation of UNRWA protection resulted from objective reasons that the agency could not rectify.

1. A change of the destination country in a return decision by an administrative authority should be regarded as a new return decision requiring an effective remedy in compliance with Article 47 CFREU.

2. The national legislation providing for a safe transit country ground applicable in the present case is contrary to EU law.

3. The obligation imposed on a third-country national to remain permanently in a closed and limited transit zone, within which their movement is limited and monitored, and which the latter cannot legally leave voluntarily, in any direction whatsoever, constitutes a deprivation of liberty, characterised as "detention" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions (RCD) and Returns Directives (RD).

4. Neither the RCD nor Article 43 of the Asylum Procedures Directive authorise detention in transit zones for a period exceeding four weeks.

5. Detention under the RCD and the RD must comply with the relevant guarantees under EU law including being based on a reasoned detention decision; consisting of a measure of last resort, following an individualised assessment of the case, its necessity and proportionality; and effective judicial review should be available. An applicant for international protection cannot be held in detention solely on the ground that they cannot support themselves. Where detention is found to contravene EU law, domestic courts may release the applicant and order the authorities to provide accommodation in line with the RCD provisions. They are empowered to do so, even if they have no clear jurisdiction under national law.

In a case of an asylum application on the grounds of gender based persecution, supported by medical reports, the Belgian Council of State held that it belongs to the asylum authorities to investigate the origin of injuries, whose nature and seriousness imply a presumption of treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR and to assess the risks they reveal.

Without this assessment, the judge cannot legally conclude that the Applicant does not establish that he has been persecuted or has suffered serious harm or been subjected to direct threats of such persecution or harm.

The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the removal of families belonging to the Sikh religious minority to Afghanistan would not constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR, as the applicants’ situation failed to reach the severity threshold required by this Article. Despite the fact that the Sikh community suffers from intimidation and intolerance within the Afghan society, the Court did not find that this group is the target of a practice of a systematic practice of ill-treatment, despite any difficulties they may be facing in the country.

The ECJ has to decide on the assessment of the existence of a serious individual threat by reason of mere presence in a certain area. It has to decide whether there is a minimal threshold of civilian fatalities that excludes such risk or if a holistic approach taking into account all circumstances special to the case has to be followed to assess the existence of such threat.

In order to guarantee that an applicant for international protection has an effective judicial remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, a national court or tribunal is required to vary a decision of the first-instance determining body that does not comply with its previous judgment. The court or tribunal must substitute its own decision on the application for international protection by disapplying, if necessary, the national law that prohibits it from proceeding in that way.