Case summaries
The case concerns the potential removal of a Syrian national of Armenian origin and Christian denomination from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2026, following the rejection of his asylum claim on safe third country grounds. The Court struck out the Article 3 complaint concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal due to the cessation of risk. It found no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 having regard to the multi-layered examination of the asylum claim and the reliance on the EU–Türkiye framework, assurances and supporting material, and held that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in a Greek police station amounted to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.
Regarding the return of a Turkish applicant from Greece to Türkiye, her account constituted a prima facie case of refoulement, shifting the burden of proof to the Greek Government after evidentiary standards from secret detention cases were applied. The return of the applicant without any individual assessment or access to remedies, despite her asylum request and risk of ill-treatment due to alleged links to opposition movements in Türkiye, amounts to a violation of Articles 3 and 13 ECHR.
The applicant’s unregistered detention at a border guard station, without legal basis, information on the reasons for her arrest, or access to judicial review, as part of a broader Greek pattern of unlawful returns, amounts to a violation of Article 5(1), (2) and (4) ECHR. Although the applicant failed to prove a real risk to life or inhuman or degrading treatment during her removal process – where she travelled by an inflatable boat with other migrants –, the absence of an effective remedy to challenge such risks amounts to a violation of Article 13 ECHR.
The Court of Justice held that defending personal interests against illegally acting non-state actors due to state corruption can be regarded as ‘political opinion’ under Directive 2011/95 if perceived as opposition by the persecuting actors.
The assessment of the existence of indiscriminate violence under Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive may not be based exclusively on a quantitative assessment of casualties and population ratios. A comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances of the individual case, and in particular those which characterise the situation of the applicant’s country of origin, is required.
In a case of an asylum application on the grounds of gender based persecution, supported by medical reports, the Belgian Council of State held that it belongs to the asylum authorities to investigate the origin of injuries, whose nature and seriousness imply a presumption of treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR and to assess the risks they reveal.
Without this assessment, the judge cannot legally conclude that the Applicant does not establish that he has been persecuted or has suffered serious harm or been subjected to direct threats of such persecution or harm.
The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the removal of families belonging to the Sikh religious minority to Afghanistan would not constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR, as the applicants’ situation failed to reach the severity threshold required by this Article. Despite the fact that the Sikh community suffers from intimidation and intolerance within the Afghan society, the Court did not find that this group is the target of a practice of a systematic practice of ill-treatment, despite any difficulties they may be facing in the country.
The fact that an asylum applicant has already been persecuted in the past or has already suffered serious harm is a serious indication of the well-founded fear of the claimant, or of the real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there is good reason to believe that this persecution or serious harm will not happen again.
When an applicant has suffered female genital mutilation in her country of origin, there is a rebuttable presumption that she will again be the victim of such persecution because of her membership in the social group of Ivorian women.
In order to guarantee that an applicant for international protection has an effective judicial remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, a national court or tribunal is required to vary a decision of the first-instance determining body that does not comply with its previous judgment. The court or tribunal must substitute its own decision on the application for international protection by disapplying, if necessary, the national law that prohibits it from proceeding in that way.
Article 21(2) of the directive precludes Member States from issuing a measure of refoulement or expulsion against the persons covered by one of the scenarios described in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 if this would expose the concerned persons to the risk of their fundamental rights as enshrined in Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU.
CJEU rules on the correct processing of applications for international protection lodged separately by family members and the interrelationship between them.