Case summaries

At issue in this case was whether the applicant qualified for subsidiary protection or protection for humanitarian reasons, considering her personal circumstances of extreme vulnerability.

The poor living conditions that the Applicants would face in the safe areas in Georgia meant they could not reasonably be expected to remain there. There was no feasible internal protection alternative

There was no serious reason, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Qualification Directive, to rule out with sufficient confidence that the risk of persecution, from which it is established that the applicant suffered, would not be repeated.

Prostitutes who come from the State of Edo, and who are both victims of human trafficking and anxious to extricate themselves actively from these networks, form a group whose members are, by reason of these two common characteristics which define them, likely to be subjected to persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, without being able to avail themselves of the protection of the Nigerian authorities. They are members of a particular social group.

Women who are subjected to the norms and customary laws of FGM and forced marriage in rural areas in Nigeria cannot avail themselves of the protection of the State authorities, and their attitude is perceived as an infringement by the community members. They therefore form a social group within the meaning of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Furthermore, the impossibility of marrying another person constitutes an obstacle to leading a normal life in another part of the country and an alternative protection alternative cannot be considered. 

The situation which prevails today in some geographical areas of Somalia, in particular in and around Mogadishu, must be seen as a situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict, in the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].

For the purposes of Art 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention a person is “of” or “has” a nationality where it is established that  he or she is already of that nationality or he or she is not of that nationality but is entitled to it.  The person should not be considered to hold a nationality if he or she only “may” be able to acquire it.

In assessing nationality in claims for refugee status, nationality is a matter for the State in question’s law, constitution and (to a limited extent) practice which should be proved by evidence and decided on, as a matter of fact, by the court deciding the protection claim.  In considering whether a person is a national or is entitled to a nationality of a second State, the person must use their “best efforts” to clarify their status.  The evidence of the attitude of a State towards a person who is seeking not to be removed to that State may be of very limited relevance.

Plea for an ab initio re-examination of an application for asylum. The Special Committee formed under Article 3(5) of Presidential Decree 61/1999 gave a positive opinion because the Applicant had been involved in political activities in his country, as a Kurd, against the ruling regime; and that activity had increased during his stay in Greece. The application for asylum was rejected by the Minister for Public Order without any specific justification for deviating from the Special Committee's clear opinion. When assessing whether there is evidence that a person seeking recognition as a refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution, the Administration may take account of information regarding the activities of the interested party's close relatives.

This case concerned service of the initial negative decision against an asylum application where the notice was served on the foreign applicant asylum seeker without specifying the language in which the applicant was informed of its content.  The court rejected an application for suspensive effect of the decision rejecting the asylum application in view of the pleas used by the applicant – of Palestinian origin – that he left his country for economic reasons, since there is no evidence that there is a risk of persecution should he return to Palestine, nor have any of the conditions for asylum on humanitarian grounds been met. The possible disruption to the lifestyle the applicant has created for himself whilst working in Greece does not constitute a reason to suspend any of the acts which form part of the asylum application examination procedure. 

The suppression of the expression of racist opinions in a State does not constitute persecution pursuant to the 1951 Refugee Convention, if actions of this kind are considered justified and proportionate following analysisof the particular circumstances.