Case summaries
The fears of an Applicant originating from a refugee camp near Tindouf were considered with regard to the Self-Proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), taken as a de facto authority.
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in R.C. v. Sweden (Application no. 41827/07) has a definitive impact on how protection needs are assessed and the scope of the duty of Swedish courts and authorities to investigate claims of torture.
The Applicant’s objective fear was not considered well-founded as persecution was not considered reasonably likely. It was held that there was a reasonable likelihood that, should he return, the Applicant would be forced to live as an internally displaced person in degrading conditions because he lacked the family network that would be required in order to reintegrate him into his homeland socially and financially. Exposure to extreme living conditions constitutes degrading treatment and deporting a person to a country where he would be subject to such conditions violates Article 3 of the ECHR. Subsidiary protection status was therefore granted.
Exclusion from refugee status of an Applicant who had carried out attacks against the Sri Lankan army in the name of the LTTE, a movement included on the list of terrorist organisations as decided by the Council of the EU, during peace-time, with full knowledge, without coercion and when he was over the age of majority.
In order to assess the change of circumstances where refugee status ceased to exist, the competent authorities must “verify, having regard to the refugee’s individual situation, that the actor or actors of protection[…], which may include international organisations controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State, including through the presence of a multinational force in that territory, have taken reasonable steps to prevent persecution, that they therefore operate, in particular, an effective legal system for the detention, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution and that the national concerned will have access to such protection if he ceases to have refugee status”.
The Applicant fled to Austria to be with her husband. She pleaded no reasons for fleeing such as problems of living as a woman in Afghanistan and the Federal Asylum Agency also made no investigations into this aspect. Only in the appeal were specific women’s issues raised. The Asylum Court decided that the Federal Asylum Agency was obliged to undertake the appropriate investigations under apparent theoretical circumstances relevant to asylum (such as gender), even if the party did not initiate such a submission.
Subsidiary protection was granted to a Roma of Serbian nationality who originated from Kosovo as the Court considered that he would currently face a risk of treatment contrary to human dignity in case of return to Serbia or to Kosovo.
The General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order, having had an application for asylum referred back to it, considered whether the submitted evidence was “new and crucial”. If so, an ab initio examination of the application would be ordered. Failure to give notification of an act does not affect its validity, but only the start of the deadline for submitting an application for its annulment. The copy of the Turkish Government Gazette which promulgated the decision regarding withdrawal of the Applicant's nationality, was new and crucial evidence. There was no justification for refusing the request for an ab initio examination of the Applicant's circumstances, nor for rejecting his application to remain in the country on humanitarian grounds.
Since the situation of generalised violence which prevailed in Sri Lanka ended with the military defeat of LTTE combatants in May 2009, the only valid ground for claiming subsidiary protection would be Article L.712-1 b) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive]. The applicant has to establish an individual risk of persecution or ill-treatment in case of return to his/her country of origin.
The case involved the rejection of an asylum application by an Iranian citizen of Kurdish origins who cited a fear of persecution because of his religious opinions and, specifically, having become a Christian. In support of his claims he submitted his baptism certificate and invoked the punishment stipulated by the legal system in his country of origin for changing his religion. The Minister for Public Order's decision on the party's application was annulled for being insufficiently reasoned.