Case summaries

When verifying an asylum seeker’s claimed sexual orientation, Member States’ freedom of action is constrained by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The evaluation of an asylum application should not be based on stereotyped notions and should include an individualised assessment taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances, vulnerability in particular.

Not declaring homosexuality at the outset to the relevant authorities can not result in a conclusion that the individual’s declaration lacks credibility.

Interventions from third parties to proceedings initiated before the National Asylum Court may be admitted.

A person with refugee status in one European Union state who applies for refugee status in a second European Union state is presumed to have unfounded fears relating to lack of protection. However, that presumption may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 

LGBTI asylum seekers (1) may be members of particular social group, (2) cannot be expected to conceal or restrain their expression of sexual orientation to reduce risk of persecution. (3) All criminalisation does not per se amount to persecution, but imprisonment actually applied does.

The Applicant's claims that he would be in danger in Syria because of the civil war there were accepted, because he was a Christian and is considered an enemy by both sides and because he left his country illegally and applied for international protection. The Applicant's fear of being killed as a non-combatant in the civil war was considered to be well-founded. It was considered that there was a reasonable chance that he would be arrested and mistreated since the Syrian state would perceive him to have political beliefs since he had lived abroad and would be considered to be opposed to the regime. Internal relocation of the Applicant was not possible because if the Applicant were to return to any region of Syria he would be at risk of suffering serious harm because of the indiscriminate violence and also because the actor of persecution was national/governmental. The Applicant was recognised as a refugee.

The ban on the introduction of new matters in appeal proceedings as stipulated in the Asylum Act does not violate the right of access to the courts contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as it represents a proportional restriction.

A man from Cameroon whom the UNHCR considered a refugee and granted permanent leave to remain in Sweden as a quota refugee was refused his application for refugee status and travel documents.

The Council of State ruled that non-governmental organisations who, by way of their statutory objects and their actions, can prove a sufficient interest in relation to the subject-matter of the proceedings, can make an application before the CNDA on the terms set out by the Council of State.

In this case, the Council of State held that the CNDA had made an error of law in ruling that Nigerian women who were victims of human trafficking networks and who had actively sought to escape the network constituted a social group within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

This case related to a dispute as to whether the UK or Belgium had responsibility for determining the applicant’s asylum claim

The Court stated that the applicant’s fear of persecution and serious threat, related to assaults by her former spouse  are unfounded because the Court believes that the applicant has a reasonable possibility of internal asylum in another part of her country of origin. Consequently, the Court rejected the applicant’s appeal  against the Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) decision refusing the grant of international protection).

Instead of non-refoulement, the Court granted the Applicant subsidiary protection status because he would be at risk of serious harm upon returning to his home country (torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment).