Case summaries
An application for asylum filed prior to 20 July 2015 cannot be considered inadmissible because subsidiary protection has already been granted by another Member State (if the protection applied for is more favourable than the existing protection). The assessment of the admissibility of an application for asylum filed prior to 20 July 2015 is subject to the laws, regulations and administrative provisions adopted pursuant to the now superseded Asylum Procedures Directive (Directive 2005/85/EU) which provided for inadmissibility of an application for asylum if refugee status had already been granted by another Member State.
Arranging for medical or psychological examination is required, for example, when the third country national indicates that they were subject to violence, which left physical or mental signs which can be confirmed by medical or psychological examination. Not all invoked health problems will require an exam. Moreover, in subsequent proceedings this obligation is limited. The authority has no basis to arrange for such an examination when the event indicated in the subsequent application related to violence which was already subject to examination in the first asylum proceedings and was considered to not be credible.
The applicant arrived in Hungary as a child and her affiliation with Falun Gong was not properly adjudicated by the asylum authority (OIN) but her asylum application made as an adult was considered a subsequent one. Relying on Article 5 (3) of the Recast Qualification Directive, the OIN considered that the applicant and her mother were malevolent when joining Falun gong solely to evoke their sur place status. The court ruled that the OIN failed to individually assess the applicant’s claim and quashed the decision.
The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) and ordered a new procedure because of the failure to thoroughly examine every claim presented by the Claimant and the incorrect application of the res iudicata principle.
The applicant is a Nigerian gay man whose credibility was questioned by the asylum authority (OIN) and his application was rejected. The court, however, found that the applicant’s statements were coherent and credible. The court found also that the psychological examination of the applicant’s sexual orientation cannot be accepted because it is humiliating and violates the right to private life.
Having restored credibility the court quashed the administrative decision and ordered a new procedure where the situation of the applicant and other gay men in Nigeria must be assessed.
There is a well-founded fear of persecution based on membership of a particular social group in the case of an applicant who, even though he is not gay, he is perceived as such by his community, his family and the authorities in his country of origin.
The Supreme Administrative Count in the case concerning housing for a refugee ruled that the applicant, as a refugee, has found herself in a very specific situation, which was not taken into account by the authority. The applicant was not able to submit all the documents and information about the members of the family who stayed in Chechnya in order to obtain housing. It is beyond any doubt that the applicant and her children cannot live with their relatives, because other members of their family are in Chechnya, so the missing information could not have had any influence on the case whatsoever.
The Supreme Administrative Court found that it is the authority which is obliged to establish all the facts and find the objective truth. Although the local act imposes an obligation on the applicant to present concrete evidence, it cannot be stated, that justifiable problems with completing the evidence by the applicant exempted the authority from its own obligation to examine the case and enabled to automatically dismiss the application. Such an understanding would be inconsistent with article 6 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees.
The three cumulative prerequisites for an internal protection alternative are not fulfilled, as it cannot be reasonably expected of the refugee to settle in the proposed part of the country. The UNHCR’s reasonability test is comparable with the national legislation’s one and UNHCR defines the internal protection alternative as ‘unreasonable’.
An applicant from Kosovo claimed persecution due to his homosexuality. His application was rejected. The Administrative Court dismissed the action, but the Supreme court annulled the judgement and returned the case to the new procedure. An act of persecution does not depend on the applicant reporting persecution (in this case rape) to the police of their country of origin.
Article 33 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with the Geneva Convention, requires Member States to allow persons to whom they have granted subsidiary protection status not only to move freely within their territory but also to choose their place of residence within that territory. However, the Directive does not prevent beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status from being subject to a residence condition for the purpose of promoting their integration where said group of persons are not in a comparable situation as non-EU citizens.