Case summaries

LGBTI asylum seekers (1) may be members of particular social group, (2) cannot be expected to conceal or restrain their expression of sexual orientation to reduce risk of persecution. (3) All criminalisation does not per se amount to persecution, but imprisonment actually applied does.

This inadmissibility decision concerned the transfer of Mrs. Hussein and her children to Italy from the Netherlands under the Dublin II Regulation. The Court found the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 ECHR and Article 13 ECHR as manifestly unfounded within the meaning of Article 35(3)(a) of the Convention. The Court found that though there were shortcomings in Italy it did not disclose systemic failures to provide support for asylum seekers there. 

The concept of a serious violation of religious freedom according to Article 9(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) does not simply refer to a serious encroachment on the freedom to practice one’s faith in private but also the freedom to practice religion in a public context.

The enforced renunciation of religious activities can constitute persecution. Since persecution may lie in the prohibition itself, the actual future behaviour of the asylum-seeker and associated involvement in the other legal interests of the party concerned (e.g. life and freedom) are not relevant.

The European Court of Human Rights held that the expulsion of an Algerian national from Slovakia to Algeria, in contempt of an interim measure issued by the Court, was in violation of Articles 3, 13 and 34 of the Convention.

This cases concerns the interpretation of Article 2(c) and Article 9(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive in a case where the two Applicants are Pakistani nationals who are members of the Ahmadi religious community and fear persecution there on the basis of religion.

This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.

More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.

The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in R.C. v. Sweden (Application no. 41827/07) has a definitive impact on how protection needs are assessed and the scope of the duty of Swedish courts and authorities to investigate claims of torture.

The Applicant’s objective fear was not considered well-founded as persecution was not considered reasonably likely. It was held that there was a reasonable likelihood that, should he return, the Applicant would be forced to live as an internally displaced person in degrading conditions because he lacked the family network that would be required in order to reintegrate him into his homeland socially and financially. Exposure to extreme living conditions constitutes degrading treatment and deporting a person to a country where he would be subject to such conditions violates Article 3 of the ECHR. Subsidiary protection status was therefore granted.

1. If an Iranian national is declined the opportunity to obtain a school-leaving certificate and attend a state school because of the refusal by Iranian authorities to issue him with identity papers, this constitutes a significant discriminatory administrative measure according to Article 9 paragraph 2 of the Qualification Directive.

 
2. The right to suitable education corresponding to a child’s abilities is recognised as a human right according to international law.

During the refugee status proceedings, the administrative authorities should clarify on what grounds a foreign husband has received protection in another country. These circumstances should be assessed consistently in two countries.

There are no objective reasons why the respective positions of two individuals should be viewed differently merely because they have applied for refugee status in two different democratic countries that respect human rights.