Case summaries
The reduction in the financial allowance available to child dependants of asylum seekers was not contrary to the requirement that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.
The Secretary of State had appealed the decision of the FTT (supported by the Upper tribunal) on several grounds of error in law. The Court upheld the tribunal on the issue of whether they had considered the gravity of the respondent’s offences (section 72 of the 2002 Act); but found that the tribunals had indeed erred when considering the application of Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, and on the applicability of Article 8 ECHR. They consequently remitted the case of MM’s deportation to the Upper Tribunal for re-examination in its entirety, based on these errors in the previous decisions. The statement of the referral left open for the respondent the possibility of an appeal on the basis of Article 3 ECHR.
The applicant is an ethnic Somali and a Sunni Muslim belonging to the Bon Clan from Mesegawayn in the Galgaduud Region, Somalia. The applicant was originally in 2014 granted subsidiary protection by the Danish Immigration Service under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2). In February 2017, the Danish Immigration Service revoked the applicant’s subsidiary protection.
The account of the applicant regarding his original application was rejected by the Board due to a lack of credibility.
The majority of the Board found probable that the applicant’s daughter if returned to Somalia would be at risk of forced circumcision.
As the primary applicant, the child was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1). Consequently, the cohabiting parents were granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) with reference to the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1 (A) 2 and 1 (F) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, published on 22 December 2009 para. 9.
The imposition of a "one-off" expedited procedure in France for unaccompanied children wishing to reunite with their family in the UK fell within the framework of the Dublin Regulation. The failure by the UK Secretary of State to give full effect to the Dublin Regulation (most notably Article 17) and the Commission’s Implementing Regulation was unlawful and as a consequence the applicant was deprived of a series of procedural safeguards and protection.
In addition the applicant’s procedural rights have been violated by virtue of the procedural deficiencies and shortcomings during the interview and review stage of the applicant’s request for family union. The lack of adequate enquiry, sufficient evidence gathering and a rushed mechanical decision making procedure meant that the applicant was subject to a process which did not adequately meet his needs.
The Court rejected the Applicant's challenges to the respondent's decision to certify his asylum claim and deport him, on the grounds (i) of his mistaken assessment of his probable situation if deported to Italy, (ii) of his misreading of the Dublin III Regulation, specifically insofar as it applies to effective remedy.
This case dealt with the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s four-stage test for the determination of sexual orientation asylum claims, set out in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“HJ (Iran)”), still held good, specifically the third and fourth stages which draw the distinction between those who would conceal their sexual orientation and whether the material reason for that is fear of persecution or for other reasons.
The Federal Supreme Court rules that the separate detention of families with minor children and the placement in a children’s home violates the right to family life in Art. 8 ECHR, if less intrusive measures than detention have not been taken into consideration.
Following the careful examination of International, European and domestic law, the Court concluded that the grant of refugee status supersedes any order made by a Family Court (regarding the return of the child to Pakistan), because it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department that is the entrusted public authority to deal with asylum matters. However, were the Family Court to discover new facts, the relevant public authority would be responsible, in principle, under the tenets of UK Administrative Law to review their decision.
Every country has the right to control the entry and residence of aliens in its territory. Withdrawal of subsidiary protection from individuals convicted of serious crimes and subsequent expulsion does not violate their right to family life under Article 8, when there are alternative means of communication, non-severed cultural ties with the motherland and a reasonable prospect of return after the entry ban expiry.
Judicial review to challenge the failure/refusal of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SoS”) to determine the application of the applicant’s spouse and two youngest children for family reunification in the UK on the following grounds: a failure to apply the SoS published policy; irrationality; breach of all the family members’ rights under Art. 8 ECHR; and (regarding the two children in the UK), breach of the duties owed under s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”).
The Upper Tribunal found that:
1) the Home Office family reunification policy embraces a series of flexible possibilities for proof of identity;
2) the reunion applications were not examined and determined which involves a public law misdemeanour within the applicant’s grounds for challenge; and
3) in any case where withdrawal or a consent order is proposed judicial scrutiny and adjudication are required.