Case summaries

To determine whether there is a violation of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR in the context of expulsion, the Court analyses if the Applicant has presented substantial grounds on (i) whether he faces a real risk of ill-treatment or death in the country of destination, and (ii)whether the national authorities carried out an adequate assessment of the evidence. States have an obligation to analyse the risk ex propio motu when they are aware of facts that could expose an individual to the risk of treatment prohibited by Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.  If the domestic jurisdictions didn’t carry out a proper assessment, the Court analyses the risk on its own on the basis of the parties submissions, international reports and its own findings.

States have an obligation, under Article 5 § 1 ECHR, to act with due diligence and impose a reasonable period of detention pending expulsion. Article 5 § 4 ECHR is breached if detained individuals can’t obtain a revision of their detention before a domestic court. 

The Court decides that the maximum period of detention for the purpose of removal of a person on the grounds of public policy or public security under Belgian law, according to which Union citizens and their family members are treated in the same way as third-country nationals subject to a return procedure, exceeds the principle of proportionality and thus does not comply with EU law.

The Court finds that third-country nationals without a valid residence title in a Member State are illegally present in that Member State and thus fall under the scope of the Return Directive, irrespective of the situation or the measures that led to the illegal presence of the person concerned. Against this backdrop, the Court holds that a deportation order cannot uphold an entry and residence ban without there being any return decision for the applicant which is thus incompatible with the Return Directive.

The Return Directive does not prevent a Member State from placing in administrative detention a third-country national residing illegally on its territory, in order to carry out the forced transfer of that national to another Member State in which that national has refugee status, where that national has refused to comply with the order to go to that other Member State and it is not possible to issue a return decision to him or her.

Due to the COVID-19 health crisis, and especially the cancellation of flights to the applicant’s country of origin, the continuation of immigration detention is no longer required because an effective return cannot be considered anymore as a reasonable perspective.  

Member States can issue a return decision together with, or right after, a negative decision on an asylum application at first instance, as long as they ensure that all judicial effects of the return decision are suspended during the time allowed to appeal and pending that appeal.

During that period, and despite being subjected to a return decision, an asylum applicant must enjoy all the rights under the Reception Conditions Directive. The applicant can rely upon any changes in circumstances affecting his claim that came up after the return decision, before the appeals authority.

Requests for family reunification must be examined even if the third-country national, who is a family member of an EU citizen who has never exercised his right of freedom of movement, is subject to an entry ban. Whether there is a relationship of dependency between the third-country national and the EU citizen and whether public policy grounds justify the entry ban must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

The CJEU ruled that the period of application of an entry ban under the Return Directive begins to run from the date on which the person concerned has actually left the territory of the Member States.

The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of an asylum applicant, whose application has been rejected.  The applicant states that upon return to his home country (Ivory Coast) he will suffer a risk of persecution.

However, both the National Court and the Supreme Court ruled that no risk of persecution exists in this case, because there is no enough evidence to conclude on that risk.