Case summaries

The impossibility to proceed with an asylum applicant’s transfer to another Member State responsible for examining the asylum application  is established once there is a clear and real risk for the interested party to be subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatments within the meaning of articles 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), even in the absence of having serious reasons to believe there are systemic failures in the Member State’s asylum system. 

Member States can issue a return decision together with, or right after, a negative decision on an asylum application at first instance, as long as they ensure that all judicial effects of the return decision are suspended during the time allowed to appeal and pending that appeal.

During that period, and despite being subjected to a return decision, an asylum applicant must enjoy all the rights under the Reception Conditions Directive. The applicant can rely upon any changes in circumstances affecting his claim that came up after the return decision, before the appeals authority.

UK Court of Appeal rules on the correct test to use when making a decision on cessation of refugee status.

The fact that a person has been the subject, in the past, of a decision excluding him from refugee status cannot automatically permit the finding that the mere presence of that person in the territory of the host Member State constitutes a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. A case-by-case assessment is necessary before a measure based on grounds of public policy or public security is adopted. This assessment includes weighing the threat against the protection of the rights of EU citizens and their family members.

Similarly, in order to adopt an expulsion decision with due regard to the principle of proportionality, account must be taken of, inter alia, the nature and gravity of the alleged conduct of the individual concerned, the duration and, when appropriate, the legality of his residence in the host Member State, the period of time that has elapsed since that conduct, the individual’s behaviour during that period, the extent to which he currently poses a danger to society, and the solidity of social, cultural and family links with the host Member State.

The complainant, an Eritrean citizen and a single woman with a one-and-a-half-year-old child, filed a complaint against the decision of the Danish Immigration Service to reject her application in accordance with the Danish Aliens Act art. 29 (b) as the Greek authorities had granted her refugee status in Greece, valid until 25 November 2017. The complainant referred to the UNHCR EXCOM-conclusion no. 58/1989.

The Board did not find that the general social and economic conditions for refugees with a residence permit in Greece – although difficult – in itself could lead to the complainant not being referred to Greece as first asylum country. The Board did not find that the complainant as a single mother with a one-and-a-half-year-old child was to be considered quite particularly vulnerable. Consequently, the Refugee Appeals Board found the conditions for using Greece as first country of asylum fulfilled. The case was, however, remitted to the Immigration Service by the Appeals Board in May 2018 upon the Service's confirmation that they would consider the application in light of the applicant's residence permit having expired in Greece. 

The Court annulled the no. 10464/31.05.2017 Decision of the Director of the Asylum Service, on the basis of which, the restriction on the movement of applicants for international protection entering the Greek islands of Lesvos, Rhodes, Samos, Kos, Leros and Chios after the 20th of March 2016, was imposed. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the competent authority may not impose the contentious restriction on movement to applicants for international protection arriving in the Greek islands after the date of the publication of the judgment.

The rescuing actor is not only responsible for the search and rescue operations but should also consider the safety of disembarkation points in line with the principle of non-refoulement. The Open Arms ship conducted a reasonable assessment of the situation during the rescue operation, given that Libya could not be considered a country where the rescued migrants could be safely returned and Italy had already communicated an available place of safety.

it should be assessed whether the migrants – if rescued by the Libyan authorities - would have been taken back to a country where there are ongoing severe violations of human rights. In the case at issue, Libya has to be considered such a country.  the rescuing actor is not only responsible for the SAR operations but also for the designation of a POS (place of safety) for the migrants to be disembarked at. the principle of non-refoulement had to be applied. the decision to communicate with the Italian authorities, which were the first interlocutor with the Open Arms during the entire operation, including during the disembarking phase, is considered reasonable.

The Council of State annulled the decision from the French national court on asylum (CNDA) after noting it had not examined the applicant’s submission that he did not have access to an interpreter during his personal interview for a re-examination of his asylum application. He had indeed appealed against the decision of the French immigration authorities (OFPRA) rejecting his claim despite his inability to be understood.

The applicant’s asylum claim has been rejected on the grounds of Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The act he committed would amount to being contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. However, the Council of State hereby decided that in failing to seek and qualify the severity of this act in the light of its effects internationally, the lower court made an error of law.

The exhaustion of domestic remedies is a prerequisite for the admissibility of applications lodged with the ECtHR under Article 35 ECHR. Removal of individuals suffering from severe medical problems may not be considered inhumane in the meaning of Article 3 ECHR, when suitable treatment exists in the country of origin.