Case summaries

The region of El Fasher, in Darfur (Sudan), is plagued by a generalised armed conflict.

Before granting subsidiary protection under Article L.712-1 c) Ceseda [which corresponds to Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive] to an applicant originating from the Congo, the Court had to inquire whether the situation of general insecurity which prevails in this country results from a situation of internal or international armed conflict.

Subsidiary protection can only be granted if all the criteria for qualifying as a refugee are not fulfilled.

The Court considered how to assess whether an applicant’s activities for insurgent groups in Afghanistan could constitute terrorism. It further considered whether attacks upon United Nations Security Council mandated forces, such as ISAF in Afghanistan, were acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, justifying exclusion from the 1951 Refugee Convention under Article 1F(c).

For conversion to be considered an acceptable protection ground the religious belief must be genuine.

Converts to Christianity in Afghanistan face a general risk of persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return. However, the Migration Court of Appeal found that an Afghan applicant did not prove it was reasonably likely that his conversion from Islam to Christianity was founded on a genuine belief. He had not shown that if he returned to his country of origin he had the intention to live as a convert. There was also no evidence that the authorities in his country of origin knew that he had converted.

Subsidiary protection can only be granted when the 1951 Refugee Convention is not applicable.

The rationale of the decision in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database) applies to cases concerning political opinion. Consequently an individual cannot be expected to modify their political beliefs or deny their opinion in order to avoid persecution. The situation in Zimbabwe was exceptional. At that time, the country guidance held that those who were unable to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime were at risk of persecution. Thus, those with no political beliefs could not be required to profess their loyalty to the regime to avoid persecution and were entitled to refugee status.

In this case the court considered the risk to a refugee of indirect refoulement from a third country. 

Refugee status was granted as the applicant was deemed at risk of persecution due to his homosexuality. The court found that homosexuals constitute a particular social group in Cameroon according to Section 60 (1) of the Residence Act / Art 10.1 (d) of the Qualification Directive. According to the Qualification Directive, sexual orientation does not only constitute an unchangeable characteristic, but is so fundamental to the identity of a person that he/she should not be forced to denounce it. That means that under the Qualification Directive it is no longer important if the applicant can persevere with abstinence in the long term. The punishment which the applicant would face due to homosexual acts in case of return does not simply constitute criminal prosecution, but is persecution in terms of Section 60 (1) Residence Act.

These joined cases concerned two Applicants who were denied protection in Germany on the basis of the exclusion provisions in the Qualification Directive.  Upon appeal the German Courts found that even if they were excluded under the Qualification Directive they may still entitled to the right of asylum recognised under Article 16A of the Grundgesetz. The CJEU, in examining Article 12, the exclusion provision in the Qualification Directive, found that the fact a person was a member of an organisation which is on the EU Common Position List 2001/931/CFSP due to its involvement in terrorist acts, does not automatically constitute a serious reason to exclude that person. Exclusion is not conditional on the person concerned representing a present danger to the host Member State or on an assessment of proportionality.